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FEDERAL LAW-CITICASTERS v.
PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1980

MCCASKILL:

PROBING

THE

INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided that the
Fourth Amendmentl empowered police to use a search warrant 2 to
forcefully enter the premises of a student newspaper office to look
for evidence of a crime, even though none of the students were sus
pects in the crime. 3 This holding produced howls of protest from
the American public, especially from members of the press, who
claimed that confidential sources would disappear in the face of the
knowledge that law enforcement officers might search offices of the
press at any time for evidence that might aid them in solving a
crime. 4 They feared that since a search warrant allowed police to
rummage through press offices in search of criminal evidence, such
searching could inadvertently endanger the anonymity of sources,
cause reporters to refrain from keeping notes, and would expose
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the
following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. A search warrant is a written order issued by a justice or magistrate authoriz
ing a law enforcement officer to enter private property to search for, and seize, any
property that constitutes contraband, things criminally possessed, or evidence of the
commission (or planned commission) of a crime. See BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY 1350
(6th ed. 1990) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41).
3. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). For a discussion of
Zurcher, see infra Part LB.
4. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3952.
In May of 1978 the Court came down with a decision in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, an opinion which leading newspapers immediately denounced as "a
first step toward a police state"; "This assault stands on its head the history of
both the First and Fourth Amendments"; "The privacy rights of the law-abid
ing were shabbily treated by the Supreme Court the other day ...."
Jd., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3952 (footnotes and citation omitted); see also
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-64. For a list of letters and articles written by members of the
press in response to Zurcher, see infra note 31.
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confidential records. 5 This holding was seen as threatening the First
Amendment right to freedom of the press. 6
In response to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First
and the Fourth Amendments in that case,7 Congress passed the Pri
vacy Protection Act of 1980 ("Privacy Protection Act" or "Act").8
The provisions of the Privacy Protection Act provide protections to
citizens beyond those offered by the Constitution by requiring po
lice use of subpoenas,9 rather than search warrants, to effect
searches on the premises of non-suspects engaged in First Amend
ment activities. IO The purpose of the Act is to ensure the protection
of First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and the press,
while permitting law enforcement officers to obtain information
needed for criminal investigations by the less invasive tool of sub
poenas. l1 The Act contains several exceptions which allow the use
of search warrants, but does not specify who decides whether one of
the exceptions applies. 12
5. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-64.
6. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides the follow
ing: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.!.
7. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and of the press. See supra
note 6 for the text of the First Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of citizens by restricting law enforce
ment officers' ability to search a person's premises for evidence of a crime, requiring
that in most cases they may do so only after procuring a search warrant issued by a
neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. See supra note 1 for the text of
the Fourth Amendment. For a discussion of the standard magistrates and courts use to
determine whether police have "probable cause," see infra note 29.
A magistrate is an appointed or elected judicial officer at the state or local level
with limited powers, including the power to issue search warrants. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 951 (6th ed. 1990). For the purpose of this Note, the term "magistrate" is
meant to encompass judges as well, who in possessing greater power, may also issue
search warrants. This term is not meant to mean Federal magistrates.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). See infra Part II for a discussion of the
Privacy Protection Act.
9. A subpoena duces tecum is "[a] court process, initiated by party in litigation,
compelling production of certain specific documents and other items, material and rele
vant to facts in issue in a pending judicial proceeding, which documents and items are in
custody and control of person or body served with process." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45, and FED. R. CRlM. P. 17).
10. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
11. See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 4-5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950,
3950-51. See infra note 31 for an explanation of why subpoenas are less invasive than a
search warrant.
12. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(a)-(b). For a list of these exceptions, see infra note 88.
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In 1995, in Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill,B a television station
sued police and the county prosecutor under the Privacy Protection
Act, claiming that the Act required the warrant-issuing magistrate
to make a specific ruling that a warrant, rather than a subpoena,14
was appropriate under one of the stated exceptions to the ACt. 15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found no
language in the text of the Privacy Protection Act discussing the
magistrate's role in the decision to use a warrant.1 6 The majority
concluded that Citicasters' position was incorrect, and that Con
gress had deliberately avoided imposing specific procedures on
states' judicial or law enforcement entitiesP
Because no language in the Act specifically addressed the issue
at hand, the dissenting opinion focused on Congress' stated goals in
passing the Privacy Protection Act-bolstering First and Fourth
Amendment rights-to decide whether a law enforcement officer
should articulate in the warrant application the exception that
prompted the perceived need for a warrant.1 8 The dissent ex
amined the Act's legislative history19 and the circumstances sur
rounding its passage,20 and found evidence to support Citicasters'
position that under the Privacy Protection Act, a neutral magistrate
should decide whether circumstances called for a search warrant. 21
This Note examines Citicasters' differing interpretations of the
Privacy Protection Act's silence on the issue of who has the power
to decide whether a search warrant is appropriate, and focuses on
the underlying constitutional concerns of these interpretations. The
majority treated Congress' silence regarding the details of proce
dure as intentional, and asserted that Congress did not think it nec
essary to intrude to that extent on state and local police procedures,
thus protecting the rights of states under the Tenth Amendment. 22
The dissent found Congress' silence ambiguous, and asserted that
without procedural provisions requiring that a magistrate rule that
13. 883 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Mo. 1995), rev'd, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
14. See infra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of search warrants.
For a discussion of subpoenas, see infra note 31 and accompanying text.
15. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1353-54.
16. See id. at 1354. See infra notes 177 and 213 and accompanying text for a
discussion of methods by which courts interpret "silence" in a statute.
17. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355.
18. See id. at 1357-60 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. See id. at 1358 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. See id. at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. See id. at 1354-55.
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one of the enumerated exceptions to the Privacy Protection Act
was applicable in a given police investigation, the Act did not ade
quately reflect Congress' goals of protecting· First Amendment
rights and enhancing Fourth Amendment rights. 23
There is an abundance of evidence to support both the major
ity and the dissent's interpretations of congressional intent. How
ever, this Note asserts that the dissent's interpretation of
congressional silence impermissibly stretches the bounds of judicial
authority and creates an unconstitutional reading of the statute. In
light of current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, this Note pro
poses that courts apply a "clear statement" rule when interpreting
the extent of federal intrusion into traditional realms of state con
trol, such as law enforcement. 24 In other words, unless Congress
expressly states in a statute that it intends to impose procedures on
state and local governments, courts should not read such implica
tions into an act.
Part I of this Note provides background material on the Fourth
Amendment and search and seizure procedures, and discusses
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.25 Part II provides a summary of the leg
islative history of the Privacy Protection Act, and discusses the
guidelines promulgated by the Justice Department in response to
the Act. Part III discusses both the district court and court of ap
peals decisions in Citicasters v. McCaskill. 26 Part IV explores the
conflicting interpretations of congressional intent that can be de
rived from the legislative history and surrounding circumstances,
and examines the Tenth Amendment concerns expressed by the
majority opinion in Citicasters. The Note concludes that congres
sional silence should be presumed intentional because of concerns
of federalism, while at the same time recognizing that the Privacy
Protection Act, as written, does not effectively reflect Congress'
stated goal in passing the Act.

23. See id. at 1358·60 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. See infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "clear
statement" theory.
25. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
26. 883 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Mo. 1995), rev'd, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).

1998]

I.

PROBING THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

441

THE CAREFULLY BALANCED SCALES: POLICE POWER AND
PRIVACY UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

Freedom of the Press and the Search and Seizure Provision of
the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro
tects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures of their per
son, home, papers and effects.27 To effectuate this goal, the Fourth
Amendment requires that searches be reasonable,2s and that search
warrants only be issued when supported by probable cause. 29
The Fourth Amendment attempts to strike a balance between
the privacy rights of citizens and the public's need for protection. 3D
In several cases, the Supreme Court has examined the privacy inter
ests of citizens who were criminal suspects to determine whether
there were circumstances in which law enforcement officers should
use the less invasive tool of the subpoena31 instead of the relatively
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See supra note 1 for the text of the Fourth
Amendment.
28. "The constitution does not define what are 'unreasonable' searches and, re
grettably, in our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test." United States v. Rabi
nowitz, 339 U.S. 56,63 (1950). Since the Court's decision in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), however, the test begins with the notion that the Fourth Amendment is
intended to protect citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy. The Katz decision is
analyzed in Samuel Dash, Katz Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U. L. REv.
296 (1968); Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend
ment, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 134; and Robert F. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdrop
ping Constitutional Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 513
(1968).
29. Presumably, a search warrant is required if the search would not be within a
person's reasonable expectations of privacy. A search warrant is a general indication of
urgent need on the part of the government for items relevant to proof of a crime (or
enforcement of other federal laws). Probable cause, the threshold proof requirement
for the issuance of a warrant, has been defined in differing ways. The standard is agreed
to be lower than that of admissibility at a trial; it is "only the probability, not a prinla
facie showing" that the evidence sought is in the place to be searched. Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). The "totality of the circumstances" test for
probable cause was articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). "The task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238.
30. See JACOB W. LANDYNKSI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
20 (1966) (treatise on the history of Supreme Court decisions and treatment of Fourth
Amendment cases). See generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP.
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937)
(treatise on the Fourth Amendment); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996). See supra note 1 for the text of
the Fourth Amendment.
31. A subpoena compels the production of materials by the use of a document
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intrusive search warrant when seeking information or evidence
from a suspect's residence or business. 32 In the late nineteenth cen
tury, the Court held that the use of search warrants for contraband
or fruits and instrumentalities of crimes did not violate the privacy
interests of criminal suspects, but that use of search warrants for
documents or records ("mere evidence" that would be useful in
proving a suspect's guilt) did violate the Fourth Amendment. 33 The
Court found such searches facially unreasonable since they were in
tended to produce evidence that would result in violations of an
individual's Fifth Amendment protection against self
incrimination. 34
However, this analytical approach changed in 1967, in Warden
v. Hayden. 35 In Hayden, the Supreme Court ruled that search war
rants for any kind of evidence were allowed by the Fourth Amendmailed or presented at the door. The individual is served with the subpoena, and is told
to report to a court at a particular time and place in the future, bringing with her the
particular documents sought. Subpoena procedure provides a mechanism for objection
prior to surrender of the requested documents, and, as noted by the Supreme Court in
Zurcher, "[u]nlike the individual whose privacy is invaded by a search, the recipient of a
subpoena may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in re
sponse to a summons to produce evidence or give testimony." Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 561 n.8 (1978) (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975)); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); Jose M. Sariego, Note, The Privacy Protection Act of 1980:
Curbing Unrestricted Third-Party Searches in the Wake of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 14
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 519, 524-33 (1981).
With a search warrant, officers may immediately enter the property where the in
formation is thought to be located, and may rifle through the files in search of the
requested material. There is no mechanism for objection prior to the search. Instead, if
in a subsequent court proceeding the court finds that the search warrant was improperly
issued, the mechanism for relief is the exclusion of the evidence seized. If the search
took place on the premises of a non-suspect, there is no relief for that non-suspect. See,
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PAl; see also Sariego, supra. Members of the press, who may rely
on confidential sources for information, were particularly threatened by the possibility
of loss of confidentiality through such search processes. See generally Dwight L. Teeter,
Jr. & S. Griffin Singer, Search Warrants in Newsrooms: Some Aspects of The Impact of
Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 67 Ky. L.J. 847 (1978-79) (discussing the impact of the
Zurcher case, Teeter and Singer provide a detailed account of the response of the press
to the decision).
32. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (providing that government
has no right to seize private papers of an individual to be used against him in a civil or
criminal case); see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (providing that
government may not use search and seizure procedures to secure any evidence for the
purpose of proving a crime against the person whose premises are searched).
33. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623; Gouled, 255 U.S. at 307.
34. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630; Gouled, 255 U.S. at 306.
35. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Overruling Gouled, the Court noted that "the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property." Id.
at 304.
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ment because the language of the amendment protected all privacy
interests equally, and that an intrusion could be made only "after
fulfilling the probable cause and particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment and after the intervention of a 'neutral and de
tached magistrate."'36 While the Court in Hayden specified that
"probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or convic
tion,"37 the Court did not specify that the evidence sought must be
in the hands or in the location of the suspect. By structuring the
language in this way, "the evidence" might properly be found any
where-in the hands of suspects and non-suspects both. However,
until Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,38 the Court had not specifically
held that the Fourth Amendment allowed the use of search war
rants if law enforcement officers sought criminal evidence from
non-suspects.
B.

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily

The Zurcher case answered the question of whether, in the
Court's opinion, law enforcement officers could procure a search
warrant to search a non-suspect's home or business for evidence of
a crime. The Supreine COliit ruled that the Fourth' Amendment
created no separate set of standards for searches of non-suspects'
properties, even in light of the First Amendment considerations rel
evant in Zurcher.39 Therefore, the district court's imposition of
subpoena procedures on law enforcement officers under such cir
cumstances was incorrect. 40 The Court suggested that if Congress
wished to quell the press' fears that allowing such searches would
reveal protected sources and restrict First Amendment freedoms,
Congress could devise some legislation that would impose limits on
police searches of press locations. 41
1.

Zurcher Decision Interprets Fourth Amendment
Expansively

In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court held that the Fourth
36. Id. at 309-10. Suspects could, however, use the self-incrimination protection
of the Fifth Amendment to prove a search "unreasonable." See Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 766 n.26 (1994).
37. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307.
38. 436 U.S. 547, 554-56 (1978).
39. See id. at 565.
40. See id. at 567-68.
41. See id. at 567.
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Amendment did not prohibit police use of search warrants for evi
dentiary materials sought from non-suspect third parties. 42 The
facts of Zurcher arose in the context of a 1971 Stanford University
student protest, where protesters injured several police officers. 43
Members of the student newspaper, the Stanford Daily, photo
graphed the violence as it occurred, and some photographs of the
protest were published in an edition of the newspaper. 44 The police
began a criminal investigation of the incident, and hoped to find at
the Stanford Daily more photographic evidence identifying the as
saulting protesters. 45 While none of the Stanford Daily staff were
suspects,46 they were hostile to the police investigation. 47 Because
the newspaper was uncooperative, when police wanted access to the
photographs, they used a search warrant to get them, and in the
process, thoroughly searched the newspaper's office. 48
The Stanford Daily filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.c. §
1983,49 claiming that the Palo Alto police force, the district attor
ney, and the magistrate who had issued the warrant violated their
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.50 The district
court agreed, and granted declaratory relief. 51
The district court held that a subpoena was always preferable
42. See id. at 556.
43. See id. at 550-51.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 551. The Court reported the following:
[T]he warrant issued on a finding of "just, probable and reasonable cause for
believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material and
relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a
Peace Officer, and Assault with Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the prem
ises of the Daily]."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Appellate Brief at 31-32).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 568 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). "[The newspaper] had announced
[a] policy of destroying any photographs that might aid prosecution of protesters." Id.
48. See id. at 551-52.
49. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1994). The text of § 1983 provides the following:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
50. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 552.
51. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd
per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
.
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to a warrant in seeking evidence from a third party not suspected of
a crime in a criminal investigation. 52 Moreover, the majority ruled
that extremely stringent standards must be applied where a non
suspect newspaper was the object of the search, because First
Amendment issues were implicated. 53 The court further held that a
search warrant should be issued only if a sworn affidavit indicated
that a subpoena would be impractica1. 54 Therefore, the district
court stated that search warrants would be acceptable "only in the
rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that 1) important
materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2)
a restraining order would be futile."55 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision. 56
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court stated
that the Fourth Amendment does not provide any specific protec
tion for the search of non-suspects' property over suspects' prop
erty.57 Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that "[t]he
critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the
property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are
located on the property to which entry is sought."58
52. See id. at 130. See supra note 31 for a discussion of subpoenas and search
warrants.
53. See Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. at 134. First Amendment protection of free
dom of speech is threatened when confidential sources may be silenced for fear of expo
sure as a result of the search process. See id. The Supreme Court summarized the
district court's outline of the particular threats posed by third party searches of the
press:
First, searches will be physically disruptive to such an extent that timely publi
cation will be impeded. Second, confidential sources of information will dry
up, and the press will also lose opportunities to cover various events because
of fears of the participants that press files will be readily available to the au
thorities. Third, reporters will be deterred from recording and preserving their
recollections for future use if such information is subject to seizure. Fourth,
the processing of news and its dissemination will be chilled by the prospects
that searches will disclose internal editorial deliberations. Fifth, the press will
resort to self-censorship to conceal its possession of information of potential
interest to the police.
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-64.
54. See Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. at 132-33.
55. Id. at 135.
56. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
57. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 554-55.
58. Id. at 556; see also id. at 556 n.6. In footnote six, Justice White cited numer
ous secondary sources supporting the view that the probable cause requirement relates
to "the things" and not the potential guilt of the owner of the property. Id. at 556 n.6.
He pointed out that the probable cause standard required for searches differs from the
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Justice White asserted that in discussing search warrants, the
Fourth Amendment does not distinguish between those who are
suspected of a crime and those who are not, nor does it prescribe
the use of subpoenas for non-suspects. 59 In support of this conclu
sion, he examined both the California Penal Code60 and the ALI
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,61 which outline proce
dures for the procurement of search warrants at the state level, and
found "no suggestion that the occupant of the place to be searched
must himself be implicated in misconduct."62
The Court concluded that the First Amendment implicated no
special protection for the press under the Fourth Amendment. The
drafters of the Constitution did not prohibit warrants of press prem
ises, Justice White argued, and subsequent cases "do no more than
insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular
exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered
by the search."63 Justice White asserted that magistrates who abide
by the Fourth Amendment's requirements for overall reasonable
ness and for the specificity of a search warrant request would pre
serve First Amendment rights. 64
probable cause standard required for arrest of a suspect. See id. In granting a search
warrant request, a magistrate must agree that there is probable cause to believe that
"criminally related objects are in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched,
at the time when the search is authorized to be conducted." Id. (quoting Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 358 (1974».
59. See id. at 558.
60. See id. at 558 n.7. Justice White noted that in California, fruits, instrumentali
ties and evidence of crime" 'may be taken on the warrant from any place, or from any
person in whose possession [they] may be.'" Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1524
(West 1970».
61. See id. at 559. Justice White cited the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 220.1(3)(Proposed Official Draft 1975), which provides that the warrant
application
shall describe with particularity the individuals or places to be searched and
the individuals or things to be seized, and shall be supported by one or more
affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show
that such individuals or things are or will be in the places, or the things are or
will be in possession of the individuals, to be searched.
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 559 (quoting § 220.1(3». The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure was created by American legal scholars as a tool for drafting codes at the
state level.
62. Zurcher, 436 U.S at 559.
63. Id. at 565.
64. See id. at 565-66. Justice White placed his faith in the neutral magistrate to
put First Amendment considerations into the "reasonableness" requirement. Id. But
see infra note 228, which provides statistics showing an apparent lack of scrutiny on the
part of federal magistrates, for example, in reviewing warrant applications.
For an argument expounding on the premier role of reasonableness in the Fourth
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In the conclusion of the opinion, the Court issued a challenge
to Congress by stating, "[o]f course, the Fourth Amendment does
not prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to es
tablish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of the
search warrant procedure. "65
2. The Public Response to Zurcher
The response of the press to the Zurcher decision was strong
and loud. 66 Numerous articles were written about the chilling effect
the decision would have on the ability of the press to do its job
effectively.67 This fear was supported by the fact that while rela
tively few search warrants of press sites had been issued in the past,
the number increased in the years following the Stanford Daily
search. 68 Journalists reported that confidential sources would disAmendment, see Amar, supra note 36. Professor Amar discusses the role of reasona
bleness in Zurcher. See Amar, supra note 36, at 778-79, 780 n.87, 805-06. For a rebuttal
of Amar's argument, see Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107
HARv. L. REv. 820 (1994) (maintaining that "reasonableness" is an unrealistic standard
with current law enforcement institutions and the status of race relations in society, and
that tight adherence to the requirement of the warrant is needed).
65. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567.
66. See Justice Department Policy Concerning News Media Search Warrants: Hear
ing Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Congo 208-15
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 House Subcomm. on Gov't Info. Hearings] (reprinting Jack
Anderson, Endangered Species: The Informer, WASH. POST, June 11, 1978; A Double
Blow by the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1978; Robert Healy, Court Ruling Devastating
to Press, BOSTON GLOBE, June 2, 1978; James J. Kilpatrick, Take That, Justice White!,
WASH. STAR, June 8, 1978; Anthony Lewis, The Court and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, June
8,1978; Protect Both Press and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,1978; The Right to Rum
mage, WASH. POST, June 1, 1978; See Search and Seizure, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1978);
see also Hearings on S. 3162 and S. 3164 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Congo 129-30 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Sub
comm. on the Constitution Hearings] (reprinting A Different Land, L.A. TIMES, June 2,
1978; The Knock on Freedom's Door, L.A. TIMES, June 2,1978; Harry Reston, Letter to
Whizzer, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1978; Searching the Press, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1978).
See Teeter & Singer, supra note 31, for a discussion of the response of the press to
Zurcher.
67. See supra note 66 for a list of some of the letters written for and by the press,
most of which express the fear that confidential sources would disappear in the wake of
the Zurcher decision. Six years earlier, the press had reacted similarly to Branzburg V.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the Supreme Court limited the right of reporters to
withhold the identity of a confidential source to a grand jury. In spite of extensive
lobbying, a federal "shield law" did not pass. See Susan K. Erburu, Zurcher V. Stanford
Daily: The Legislative Debate, 17 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 152, 153 (1980).
68. The 14 searches of newsrooms and broadcast stations that occurred in the
seven years following the search of the Stanford Daily are listed and summarized in
Appendix B of Statement of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, in
Zurcher V. Stanford Daily: Hearings on H.R. 3486 and H.R. 4181 as Related to Zurcher
V. Stanford Daily Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad
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appear because of fear of exposure through search procedures. 69
In addition, members of the press were skeptical that the "neu
tral magistrate" issuing warrants on the basis of probable cause was
truly neutral.7° The displeasure with the Zurcher decision was
based not only on the perception that Fourth Amendment protec
tion had been diminished, but on the perception that magistrates,
often elected officials at the state and local levels, and not even
necessarily attorneys, were in fact often political allies of the law
enforcement agencies.7 1 The Zurcher decision, and Justice White's
challenge, prompted a swift congressional response.
II.

THE PRIVACY PROTECfION ACT OF

1980

Within two weeks of the Zurcher decision, the House n and
Senate73 began subcommittee hearings on the topic of protecting
third party non-suspects from searches by law enforcement officers
involved in criminal investigations. President Jimmy Carter asked
members of his administration, primarily officials in the Departministration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congo 155-56 (1979) [herein
after 1979 House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing].
69. See Teeter & Singer, supra note 31, at 860-61. Professors Teeter and Singer
quote from a memo by a Boston Globe editor, about a conversation which took place
three weeks after the Zurcher decision, wherein a confidential source implied to the
Globe that he was unlikely to call again because he feared that his anonymity was no
longer protected. See id. (quoting Memorandum from Religion Editor, The Boston
Globe, to Robert L. Healy, Executive Editor, The Boston Globe).
In addition, press executives immediately developed strategies for coping with
unannounced searches. For example, an attorney for the Gannett Company circulated
a memorandum to each of the company's seventy eight newspapers recommending pro
cedures to be adopted in the event of an unannounced search, including cooperating, to
minimize risk of rummaging through private files, and gathering the names of judges
likely to grant reversal of warrants. See id. at 863 (quoting Memorandum from Douglas
H. McCorkindale, Senior Vice President, Finance and Law, The Gannett Co., Inc., War
ranted Searches of Newspaper Offices (June 13, 1978».
70. See Teeter & Singer, supra note 31, at 857-59; see also 1979 House Subcomm.
on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 135 (statement of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, delivered by Jack C. Landau).
71. See Teeter & Singer, supra note 31, at 857-59. Teeter and Singer quote Bill
Monroe, NBC News Correspondent, as having expressed doubt whether there was "de
pendable protection in the restraint of judges and law enforcement officials." Id. at 858
(quoting Congress Moves on /3 Bills to Limit Searches, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Oct.
1978, at 19). In addition, they quote Jack C. Landau's statement before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, that "politically appointed or elected magistrates are not an ade
quate safeguard for the First Amendment interests of press organizations whose histori
cal function is to expose the corruption and misdeeds of the very political structure of
which the local magistrate is an integral part." Id. at 859.
72. See 1978 House Subcomm. on Gov't Info. Hearings, supra note 66.
73. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66.
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ment of Justice, to study the issue and draft a bill.14
A.

The Enactment of the Privacy Protection Act

During the 1978-79 session, members of Congress introduced
nineteen third party search warrant protection bills.75 By March of
1980, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on three
Senate bills and discussed one House bill.16 While all the bills es
tablished a subpoena-first rule for instances in which materials
needed for criminal investigation were in the hands of non-suspect
third parties, they differed in detail. Some notable differences in
the bills introduced included provisions protecting all non-suspect
third parties77 (the Privacy Protection Act protects only those in
volved in First Amendment activities), provisions for an exclusion
ary rule 78 (the Privacy Protection Act explicitly rejects use of the
exclusionary rule), and provisions requiring a law enforcement of
ficer to articulate to a magistrate the reasons a warrant was sought
(the Privacy Protection Act has no such provision).19
74. See Privacy Protection Act: Hearing on S. 115, S. 1790, and S. 1816 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Congo 50 (1980) (statement of Philip Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter
Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings]; 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings,
supra note 66, at 329 (testimony of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Crim
inal Division, Department of Justice).
75. See Erburu, supra note 67, at 154 n.13 (listing the nineteen bills introduced in
1978).
76. The bills considered were S. 115, S. 1790, S. 1816, and H.R. 3486. See Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 3 (opening statement of Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judici~ry).
77. For example, S. 1816, introduced by Senator Nelson, proposed to cover all
non-suspect third parties. Under the terms of this bill, police needed to satisfy the
higher standard of "probable cause" (rather than the "reasonable cause" required in
other bills) that one of the exceptions to the subpoena-first requirement was met to
justify the need for a warrant. See S. 1816, 96th Congo § 3 (1980), reprinted in Senate
Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 27, 28.
78. A distinctive feature of S. 1816, described supra note 77, was its inclusion of
an exclusionary rule, whereby evidence gathered not in accordance with the provisions
of the bill was to be excluded at trial. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note
74, at 28. The exclusionary rule was explicitly rejected in the final bill. See 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000aa-6(e) (1994) ("Evidence otherwise admissible in a proceeding shall not be ex
cluded on the basis of a violation of this chapter.")
79. Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., proposed S. 115, which would establish protec
tion for "any matter," not just documentary material and work product, for all non
suspect third parties from searches by federal, state, and local officials. See S. 115, 96th
Congo (1980), reprinted in Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 12. Sena
tor Mathias's bill contained explicit provisions requiring the officer to articulate to a
judge or magistrate the reason a warrant was required. See id., reprinted in Senate Judi
ciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 13. The bill proposed the following:
The provisions of this Act do not prevent a judge or magistrate from issuing ex
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The Privacy Protection Act of 1980 was signed by President
Jimmy Carter on October 14, 1980. 80 After debate over the com
peting but similar House and Senate bills, Congress adopted the bill
drafted by President Carter's administrative team, with only minor
changes. 81 Congress concluded that the new law would cover only
those parties involved in First Amendment-related activities, for
which only the Justice Department had lobbied, rather than cover
ing all non-suspect third parties, for which most constituents had
lobbied. 82 The drafters of the Act limited its application to this cat
egory of non-suspects for two reasons: first, they feared that a
broader bill would be found unconstitutional83 and second, they
parte a warrant or other legal process to search for and seize ... any matter in
the possession or control of a third party in any case in which the applicant for
the warrant . .. shows
(a) upon his personal knowledge or that of another present before the
judge or magistrate that there is probable cause to believe that if an order ... is
issued in accordance with subsection (b) of section 2 such matter will be de
stroyed, altered, or put beyond the control or the jurisdiction of the court ....
Id., reprinted in Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 13 (emphasis ad
ded). No action was taken on this bill, and none of its language appeared in the final
version of the bill eventually adopted.
80. See Pub. L. No. 96-440,94 Stat. 1879 (1980); see also PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, JIMMY CARTER, 1980-81, BOOK III 2218 (1982). The bill passed was sub
stantially that originally written by the Justice Department under the Carter Adminis
tration, which had been offered to the Senate by Senator Birch Bayh, Chair of the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary. See S. REp. No.
96-874, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3950; see also Senate Judiciary
Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 1-3 (opening statement of Senator Edward M. Ken
nedy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary); Dan Rosen, Newsroom Searches: The
Privacy Protection Act Takes Effect, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193,212-15 (1981) (describing
the Administration's role in drafting the Act).
81. See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 8-9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3955.
82. See id. at 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3955.
83. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at
334. Congressional authority to enact the bill, which pertains to state and local investi
gators as well as federal agents, is based on the Commerce Clause. See S. REp. No. 96
874, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3956. Under the Commerce Clause, Con
gress is empowered "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev
eral States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Drafters of the bill were confident that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the
authority to pass legislation affecting those involved in First Amendment activities be
cause published or broadcast materials regularly cross state lines. See 1978 Senate Sub
comm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 334. A broader set of
protections, such as for all non-suspects, would have been based on the fifth section of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to enforce, by the passage
of laws, the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the first clause, which
says that no state can make or enforce any law that deprives any person of "life, liberty
or property, without due process of law," or denies any person the "equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, §§ 1,5. Since the Supreme Court in Zurcher had
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feared that the broader category would require the inclusion of
more exceptions, or would jeopardize law enforcement efforts.84
The fundamental premise of the Act was that the subpoena, a
less intrusive means of obtaining evidence, offered better protection
of innocent parties than the search warrant. 85 Thus, under the Act,
when dealing with non-suspects who had information which was to
be disseminated to the public, law enforcement officers must use a
subpoena in all but a few instances when seeking evidence in a
criminal investigation. 86
Under the Act, criminal investigators seeking information from
"a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to
the public ... [some] form of public communication"87 must obtain
a subpoena instead of a search warrant unless one of six stated ex
ceptions applies. 88 The Carter Administration drafters carefully
said the use of search warrants for non-suspects was constitutional, the Justice Depart
ment argued strenuously that Congress could not justify the Privacy Protection Act on
the grounds that it enforced the constitutional rights of citizens. See 1978 Senate Sub
comm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 333-34.
For a recent Supreme Court decision validating this argument, see City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), where the Court ruled that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act prohibited state actions that were constitutional under the Court's in
terpretation of the First Amendment Free Exercise clause, and thus exceeded the scope
of Congress' enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
id. at 2170-72.
84. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at
334. Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General for the United States Department of
Justice, Criminal Division, and primary drafter of the bill, in his testimony to the Sub
committee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, stated the following:
With a broad third party bill, there is a requirement for a broad exception
category. . . . The problem has always been ... that most third parties who
might be searched will be brothers or sisters, parents or children, friends or
lovers, associates or accomplices of the suspect. With all those categories, it is
almost impossible to judge whether there is a likelihood that the evidence
would be destroyed.
We are afraid that the protection offered would be either illusory or far
too extensive. It would be illusory if the magistrate were prepared to accept
the conclusion that a brother is likely to destroy evidence held against his
brother or a father will not deliver evidence subpenaed [sic] for use against his
son. I think those are reasonable conclusions.
If a magistrate would accept those conclusions, then a broad third-party
biII would have practically no impact because everything would be in the ex
ception category.
Id.
85. See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950-51. See
supra note 31 for a discussion of how a subpoena is less intrusive than a search warrant.
86. See 42 U.S.c. §2000aa; see also S. REp. No. 96-874, at 4-5, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950-51.
87. 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa.
88. See id. § 2000aa(a)-(b). The exceptions in the case of documentary materials
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crafted the language of the Act to protect a broad spectrum of First
Amendment activities, but did not protect all third party non-sus
pects.89 While the Act does specify that exceptions to the sub
poena-first rule exist, it does not specify whether the investigator or
are as follows: 1) if there is probable cause to believe the possessor of the materials
sought is involved in the commission of the crime, or 2) if there is reason to believe that
the immediate seizure of the materials is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
harm, 3) when there is reason to believe that the use of a subpoena would result in the
destruction of the materials sought, and 4) if materials sought through the use of a
subpoena are not produced. If the information takes the form of work product, then
exceptions are 5) if there is probable cause to believe the possessor of the materials
sought is involved in the commission of the crime, or 6) if there is reason to believe that
the immediate seizure of the materials is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
harm. See id. In addition, the Act makes clear that it is not meant to impair customs
and border searches. See id. § 2000aa-5.
42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-7(a)-(b) provides key definitions, including definitions of "doc
umentary materials" and "work product":
(a) 'Documentary materials', as used in this chapter, means materials upon
which information is recorded, and includes, but is not limited to, written or
printed materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video tapes,
audio tapes, and other mechanically, magentically [sic] or electronically re
corded cards, tapes, or discs, but does not include contraband or the fruits of a
crime or things otherwise criminally possessed, or property designed or in
tended for use, or which is or has been used as, the means of committing a
criminal offense.
(b) 'Work product materials', as used in this chapter, means materials, other
than contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise criminally pos
sessed, or property designed or intended for use, or which is or has been used,
as the means of committing a criminal offense, and
(1) in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public, are pre
pared, produced, authored, or created, whether by the person in posses
sion of the materials or by any other person;
(2) are possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the
public; and
(3) include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of the
person who prepared, produced, authored, or created such material.
Id. (footnote omitted).
89. The Act provides protection to people with an intent to disseminate informa
tion to the public. See id. § 2000aa; see also 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution
Hearings, supra note 66, at 331 (testimony of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney Gen
eral, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, regarding the language of the proposal
drafted by the Department of Justice which was subsequently utilized in the drafting of
the bill). Heymann stated the following:
The heart of our proposal is the notion that the work product of reporters,
lonely scholars, and the famous lonely pamphleteer deserves to be protected
against Government seizure. It is a protection that goes beyond the organized
and established press. It goes beyond the large press. We anticipate a protec
tion that goes to anybody who is preparing papers, tapes, or photographs for
dissemination to the public.
Id.
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the warrant-issuing magistrate decides that 'one of the exceptions
has been met.
The Act creates a civil action for those who find themselves
subject to a search warrant in violation of the Act.90 There is a civil
remedy for violations of the Act's provisions, with minimum dam
ages of one thousand dollars. 91 Any official sued in his or her indi
vidual capacity has a complete "good faith defense" available if the
officer or employee "had a reasonable good faith belief in the law
fulness of his conduct."92 The Act specifically grants full immunity
from liability to magistrates issuing warrants under the Act. 93
In the final section of the Act, Congress ordered that the Jus
tice Department develop guidelines for federal agents to use sub
poenas for most non-suspects in addition to third parties engaged in
First Amendment activities. This final section provides the stan
dards that the Department of Justice was to use in its development
of guidelines for federal agents when seeking investigative material
from the broader class of non-suspect third parties. 94 The Act
required the development of guidelines for federal agent proce
90. See 42 U.s.c. § 2000aa-6(a)-(h).
91. See id. § 2000aa-6(a), (f). In addition, under this section, a person may sue
any governmental unit, which is liable for actions of employees acting within the scope
of their employment. Government employees may be sued individually if a state has
not waived its sovereign immunity under its constitution. See id. § 2000aa-6(a)(2).
92. Id. § 2000aa-6(b). Section 2000aa-6(c) specifically disallows a good faith de
fense for governmental units.
93. See id. § 2000aa-6(c). This provision seems to codify common law immunity
available to judges and magistrates.
94. See id. § 2000aa-ll to -12. Section 2000aa-ll provides the following:
(a) Procedures to obtain documentary evidence; protection of certain privacy
interests
The Attorney General shall, within six months ... issue guidelines for the
procedures to be employed by any Federal officer or employee, in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of an offense, to obtain documentary
materials in the private possession of a person ... not reasonably believed to
be a suspect in such offense .... The Attorney General shall incorporate in
such guidelines
(1) a recognition of the personal privacy interests of the person in posses
sion of such documentary materials;
(2) a requirement that the least intrusive method ... of obtaining such
materials be used ...
(3) a recognition of special concern for privacy interests ... between cler
gyman and parishioner; lawyer and client; or doctor and patient; and
(4) a requirement that an application for a warrant to conduct a search
governed by this subchapter be approved by an attorney for the government
Id. § 2000aa-11.
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dures in situations such as attorney-client and doctor-patient
relationships.95
In hearings and in the Senate Report, members of Congress
expressed the hope that state and local governments would use the
guidelines created by the Justice Department to create parallel pro
cedures at the state and local level, which Congress felt it could not
constitutionally mandate. 96 Thus, the Privacy Protection Act does
not clearly delineate procedural standards at the state or local level,
nor does it demand the development of broader parameters for
subpoena-first directives at the state or local level.
B.

Attorney General's Guidelines

In 1981, the Justice Department issued its "Guidelines on
Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Par
ties" ("Guidelines") in response to Congress' directive in the Pri
vacy Protection Act. 97 The Guidelines direct federal agents to
obtain authorization from a Deputy Assistant Attorney General or
other high official in the Department of Justice before a warrant,
instead of a subpoena, can be sought. 98 This process is triggered
whenever evidence relevant to a criminal investigation is in the
hands of a non-suspect. Agents must submit to a government attor
ney a description of the facts and circumstances which serve as their
basis in seeking a warrant rather than a subpoena. 99 Additionally,
the Guidelines provide a list of considerations which a Deputy As
sistant Attorney General must use to determine whether a request
for a warrant is appropriate. IOO Only after obtaining authorization
from an appropriate Deputy Assistant Attorney General maya fed
eral agent seek a warrant from a federal magistrate.1 01 Thus, under
the Guidelines, a federal agent must expressly overcome the De
95. See id. § 2000aa-11. The Act did not require that federal regulations give the
subpoena-first preference to relatives of suspects.
96. See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950,
3955.
97. See "Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by
Third Parties," 28 c.F.R. §§ 59.1-.6 (1997).
98. See id. § 59.4(b)(2).
99. See id. § 59.4(b)(3).
100. See id. § 59.4(c). Section 59.4(c), entitled "Considerations bearing on choice
of methods," suggests that the primary concerns are whether the materials sought are in
danger of becoming unavailable absent the use of a search warrant and the urgency of
the government's need for the materials. Id. These considerations parallel those in the
Privacy Protection Act.
101. See id. § 59.4(a)(2).
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partment of Justice's presumption in favor of a subpoena in order
to secure permission to seek a warrant from a magistrate.
The next part of this Note discusses the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of provisions of the
Privacy Protection Act and the congressionally mandated federal
guidelines in Citicasters v. McCaskill. 102 In Citicasters, the majority
and dissenting opinions highlight different interpretations of the
purpose and provisions of the Act concerning the role of the magis
trate in authorizing a search warrant. The majority and dissent
each interpret the statute's silence regarding procedural matters,
but arrive at opposing conclusions. 103
III.

A.

CITICASTERS V. MCCASKILL I04

Facts of the Case

In 1994, a tourist filming the sights of Kansas City, Missouri
inadvertently videotaped the abduction of a woman. IOS He sold a
copy of the tape to WDAF, a local television station, when he
learned that the woman had been found murdered.1 06 After seeing
a clip from the videotape on the evening news, the police requested
a copy of the tape from the television station. l07 The station re
fused to release anything but the portion aired on the news for the
police's criminal investigation unless the police obtained a sub
poena, as required by the Privacy Protection Act of 1980. 108 Due to
problems of timing, a subpoena was not available and the police
obtained a search warrant instead.109
102. 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
103. See id. at 1350, 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
105. See id. at 1352; Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill, 883 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (W.D.
Mo. 1995), rev'd, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
106. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1352.
107. See id.
108. See id. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals opinions indicate
why the station was unwilling to voluntarily release the rest of the videotape. Accord
ing to the facts of the case, the tourist who filmed the event was at the television station
with his original videotape when the police arrived, but police were not informed of his
presence there. In fact, the station manager appears to have intentionally misled the
police by stating merely that the tourist would be home three days later. See id. at 1352
n.l.

109. See Citicasters, 883 F. Supp. at 1287. The police were unable to secure a
subpoena because, under Missouri law, a subpoena is only available when an actual
case is pending, and is not available at the investigatory stage of a proceeding. While a
grand jury can order the issuance of a subpoena in its determination of probable cause
for an indictment, in this instance the grand jury would not be sitting until a week after
the time when the materials were sought. See id.
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The police, in the company of Prosecuting Attorney Claire Mc
Caskill, executed the search warrant at the station and obtained the
tape. 110 Subsequently, Citicasters, Inc., the station owner, sued the
police and the County Prosecutor for violation of the Privacy Pro
tection Act, as well as violation of 42 U.S.c. § 1983.111 Citicasters
contended that the Privacy Protection Act required that the investi
gators specify, in their affidavit to the warrant-issuing magistrate,
the exceptiones) under which they justified the need for the search
warrant. 11Z
B.

District Court Opinion

The United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri held that the County Prosecutor had violated the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980.1 13 The court found that the videotape was
"documentary material" as defined by the Act, and thus subject to
warrant exceptions.11 4 However, the district court agreed with Citi
casters that, because the defendants had not specified in the search
warrant the factual basis for the claimed exceptions, they were
barred from claiming that the exceptions existed after the fact. 115
To support this conclusion, the court asserted that granting law en
forcement officials a warrant without requiring them to state under
which exception to the Act the warrant was sought would give law
enforcement officials an opportunity to retroactively justify their
conduct. 116
The court found language in the legislative history of the Pri
vacy Protection Act that implied that the magistrate was to consider
Missouri's criminal procedures are not unusual, and this concern was mentioned by
speakers at congressional hearings. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
110. See Citicasters, 883 F. Supp. at 1285.
111. See id. at 1285.
112. See id. at 1288.
113. See id. at 1293.
114. Id. at 1286. The court found that the tape was documentary material and
dismissed the defendant's claim that the material was neither work product nor docu
mentary material because it had not been possessed with intent to disseminate it to the
public. In spite of the fact that the station was not planning to air the materials sought,
the court took note of the fact that the Privacy Protection Act grew out of Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), where similarly, the materials sought were not
going to be published. See Citicasters, 883 F. Supp. at 1286-87. For a discussion of the
Zurcher case, see supra Part LB. The court, in Citicasters, interpreted the statute to
cover all "materials ... connected with a public communication." Citicasters, 883 F.
Supp. at 1287. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for the relevant language of
the Privacy Protection Act.
115. See Citicasters, 883 F. Supp. at 1288.
116. See id.
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the exceptions under which the warrant was sought at the time of
granting or refusing the warrant. 117 The court concluded that Con
gress envisioned that a law enforcement agent would articulate the
basis for the exception when applying for the warrant, and that the
neutral magistrate would review the basis for the exception in eval
uating the need for a search warrant. 118
While the district court denied an injunction requested by Citi
casters,119 in finding for the station it granted the minimal civil rem
edy prescribed by the Act, damages of $1,000.120
C.

Court of Appeals Opinion121

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re
versed the lower court and held that a government agent does not
have to state the reasons supporting an exception to the Privacy
Protection Act in the affidavit for the search warrant.1 22 In so rul
ing, the court remanded the case to the district court to give the
defendant, County Prosecutor Claire McCaskill, the opportunity to
show that "the exceptions claimed in fact existed,"123 or that she
"possessed a reasonable belief that an exception to the Privacy Pro
tection Act existed."124 The dissent argued that Congress had as
sumed that government agents would have to state the reasons
supporting an exception to the Act in the affidavit for the search
warrant.125
117. See id. The Senate conference report noted that exceptions were "factors to
be 'considered by a magistrate.''' Id. (citing S. REp. No 96-874, at 13 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3954).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1289-90. Citicasters sought an injunction requiring the police to
return to Citicasters its copy of the videotape. See id. at 1289. In addition, it wished the
injunction to state that the law enforcement officials were prohibited from seizing any
documentary materials from Citicasters in the future "except in accordance with law."
Id. The court did order that the tape be returned to the plaintiff, but refused the claim
for future injunctive relief under the Privacy Protection Act as well as under 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983, the other statute under which relief was sought and denied. The injunction was
denied because the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of a threat of future seizure.
See id. at 1290.
120. See id. at 1292.
121. Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996).
122. See id. at 1356.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1357 (referring to one of the affirmative defenses of the Act). See
supra text accompanying note 92 for the relevant language of the Privacy Protection
Act.
125. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1358-59 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissent
ing in part).
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Majority Opinion

To begin its analysis, the court reviewed the district court's in
terpretation of the ACt. 126 Noting that the district court had
reached its conclusion by analyzing legislative history,127 the Eighth
Circuit first turned to the text of the Act to determine whether use
of legislative history was warranted.1 28
In interpreting the text of the Privacy Protection Act, the
Eighth Circuit held that the language was clear and unambigu
ous.129 Because of this, the majority stated that an examination of
the legislative history was unnecessary.13° To support this conclu
sion, the Eighth Circuit noted the following:
[I]t is a fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that "we
begin with the language of the statute and ask whether Congress
has spoken on the subject before us. 'If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court .' .. must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."'131

The Eighth Circuit examined the text of the Act and deter
mined that there were places where Congress specifically pre
scribed procedures for law enforcement officers to follow in order
to comply with the ACt. 132 Thus, the majority concluded that the
absence of procedural prescriptions concerning search warrant ap
plications was deliberate.133 Judge Magill, writing for the majority,
wrote the following:
126. See id. at 1354.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1355.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 1354-55 (quoting Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatch
ers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 118 (1991) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 667 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 613 U.S.
115, 120 (1994); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503
U.S. 393, 401 (1992); West Va. Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991);
Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 73 F.3d 764, 766 (8th CiT. 1996); Arkansas
AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th CiT. 1993) (en banc».
132. See id. at 1355 n.6. The court stated, "[i]ndeed, we note that Congress did
choose to somewhat modify the search warrant application process in other circum
stances. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(c) (where 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(b)(4)(B) exception ap
plies, person possessing materials may submit an affidavit contesting issuance of
warrant)." Id.
133. See id. The Court noted that the Act provides an opportunity for the indi
vidual holding materials sought by the law enforcement officers to challenge the use of
a search warrant through the use of an affidavit. See id.; see also 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(c)
(1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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That Congress did not choose to substantially interfere with the
procedures by which state judicial officers issue search warrants
to state law enforcement officials more likely reflects, in our
view, congressional appreciation of the proper restraints of feder
alism, rather than congressional ineptitude in drafting the legisla
tion that it intends. 134
As further support for its conclusion that the government does not
have to list the exception enumerated in the Act in its warrant ap
plication, the court held that Congress intended the remedy of dam
ages to be the enforcement tool rather than "elaborate procedural
requirements." 135 In addition, the court referenced the United
States Attorney General's Guidelines for seeking search warrants
on any non-suspect third party.136 The Guidelines require the fed
eral agent to explicitly consider whether circumstances justify the
request for a warrant. 137 Under the Guidelines, the federal agent is
not directed to document her reasons for seeking a search warrant
in the affidavit to the magistrate. 138 Therefore, the court concluded,
Congress not only intended to leave procedural details out of the
Privacy Protection Act, but intended that the search warrant deci-.
sion-making process be left solely in the hands of the law enforce
ment agency.B 9
2.

Judge Bright's Dissent

Judge Bright supported the district court decision and dis
sented in part from the majority opinion. 140 In contrast to the ma
jority, he concluded that the language of the Act did not clarify the
confusion regarding whether the magistrate had a role in deciding
whether one of the exceptions to the Act had been met. Conse
quently, Judge Bright relied on the legislative history of the Privacy
134. Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.6.
135. Id. at 1355.
136. See id. at 1354 n.5 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 59.1-.6 (1995)). See supra note 97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the guidelines promulgated as a result of the
Privacy Protection Act.
137. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1354 n.5.
138. See id.; see also 28 c.F.R. § 59.4(a)(2) (1997); supra note 94 and accompany
ing text.
139. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1354 n.5, 1355.
140. See id. at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Bright concurred with the majority on its decision to remand the case to the district
court to resolve the issue of whether County Prosecutor McCaskill had participated in
the search and seizure, and to resolve a disputed issue between the parties as to whether
it was the original or a copy of the videotape that had been returned by police to Citi
casters. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Protection Act to determine the intent of Congress. 141
Judge Bright's analysis, like that of the majority, began with
the language of the statute. He noted that the Act specifically listed
the available exceptions to the requirement for a subpoena when
seeking evidence from a non-suspect engaged in First Amendment
activities, and required "reason to believe" that one of the excep
tions applied. 142 He further noted that the statute does not denote
whether it is the magistrate or the government agent who must
have "reason to believe."143 However, unlike the majority, Judge
Bright did not find the statute's silence on the procedural issues,
when substantive issues were so explicitly stated, to provide a clear
directive. 144 Instead, he concluded that the absence of procedural
guidelines was "crucial in deciding this case."145 As support for his
conclusion, he noted that if Congress failed to address an issue in a
given statute, it is appropriate to look at the legislative history,146
the circumstances surrounding the enactment,147 judicial concepts
at the time the law was enacted,148 and the overall purpose of the
act 149 for clarification.
Turning first to the circumstances surrounding the enactment,
Judge Bright concluded that since the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily150
prompted Congress to act, the court of appeals should look to the
search warrant procedures described in Zurcher, and assume that
Congress would leave these procedural standards intact unless it
141. See id. at 1357-58 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Id. at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 42
U.S.c. § 2000aa(b) (1994».
143. Id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000aa(b) (1994».
144. See id. at 1357-58 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Although the majority opinion explains that the language of the statute is not ambig
uous, it is the absence of procedural requirements rather than any ambiguity that is
crucial in deciding this case .... It is this absence of a statutory directive which faces us
here.").
145. Id. at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. See id. at 1358 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991); Arkansas AFL
CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1440 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc».
147. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Security
Bank Minn. v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 432, 436 (8th Cir. 1993».
148. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Estate of
Wood v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1155, 1160 (8th Cir. 1990); Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d
276, 280 (8th Cir. 1988».
149. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re
Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 385 (8th Cir. 1991».
150. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See supra Part 1.B.1 for a discussion of the Zurcher
case.
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stated specifically otherwise.1 51 To this end, Judge Bright found
that both the majority and dissent in Zurcher indicated that the
magistrate carried the burden of deciding whether the appropriate
circumstances existed to support the issuance of a warrant. 152
Although Judge Bright acknowledged that the magistrate's deci
sion-making role was not the focus of Zurcher, he asserted that
both the majority and dissenting opinions in that case did not ques
tion the procedures described. 153 Therefore, since the Senate Re
port of the Act's legislative history stated that the Privacy
Protection Act was enacted in response to Zurcher, Judge Bright
concluded that "Congress envisioned the procedural framework to
remain intact. "154 Thus, the dissent asserted, Congress assumed
that the applicability of the Act's exceptions would be evaluated by
a magistrate prior to issuing the warrant.
Next, the dissent examined the Act's legislative history to find
evidence of specific congressional thinking or assumptions regard
ing whether officers must articulate which Privacy Protection Act
exception was applicable in the search warrant application to the
magistrate. 155 Judge Bright concluded that two parts of the legisla
tive history demonstrated that Congress expected such a procedure.
First, the Senate Report recites a number of factors that" 'the Com
mittee believes might be considered by a magis-trate' "156 when de
ciding whether documentary materials can be obtained by a search
151. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1358-59 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissent
ing in part).
152. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Zurcher,
436 U.S. at 550, 577). See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 552, for a description of the procedure
outlined by the majority opinion. See id. at 577-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting), for a de
scription of the procedures the dissent would prescribe.
153. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1358 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
154. [d. at 1358-59 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. See id. at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. [d. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing S. REp. No.
96-874, at 13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3959-60). While cited by the
dissent purely to indicate the assumption by the writers of the Senate Report that a
magistrate would have the role of deciding whether there was reason to believe that
evidence might be destroyed, it is interesting to note the type of evidence that would be
considered relevant to such a determination. The factors that might be considered by a
magistrate include the following:
evidence of a close personal, family or business relationship between the per
son in possession of the material with a person who is a suspect; evidence of
prior, similar conduct by a party who may exert control of the material; or
evidence that a party in possession of the material has expressed an intent to
hide, move, or destroy the material sought.
S. REp. No. 96-874, at 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3959-60.
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warrant. Second, comments by Senators Orrin Hatch and Alan
Simpson in the Senate Report make specific reference to the deci
sion-making role of magistrates in the Act. 157 Judge Bright con
cluded from the Senate Report that the magistrate should
specifically rule on the issuance of the warrant based on the ade
quacy of the exceptions stated. 158
In addition, Judge Bright focused on Congress' recognition
that the Act grew from the Fourth Amendment, and was created to
specifically bolster the Fourth Amendment's inadequate protection
for non-suspects engaged in First Amendment activities.1 59 With
this constitutional principle as a foundation, he examined prior
Fourth Amendment decisions to analyze the role of magistrates in
search and seizure matters. 160 The primary function of magistrates,
according to Supreme Court precedent, is to neutrally evaluate the
quality and quantity of evidence gathered by law enforcement of
ficers and to determine whether it is "sufficient to justify invasion of
a citizen's private premises."16I The dissent noted that the Supreme
Court has observed that Fourth Amendment protections are en
sured by requiring that probable cause determinations are made by
a neutral magistrate, not an "officer engaged in the often competi
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime."162 From this description of
proper warrant procedure under the Fourth Amendment, Judge
Bright concluded that a government agent seeking a warrant in
stead of a subpoena must articulate which exception to the Act
would justify a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. 163
As his final point in dissent, Judge Bright stated that the pur
pose of the Privacy Protection Act was to prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. l64 He argued that to allow after-the-fact jus
tification 'Of search warrant issuance by the law enforcement agent
"pulls the teeth out of the statute" by removing the protective pre
search screen of the neutral magistrate. 165 Furthermore, while the
157. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing S. REP. No. 96-874, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3968).
158. See id. at 1359-60 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
159. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972».
162. Id. at 1359 n.4 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948».
163. See id. at 1359-60 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Bright wrote
the following:
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Act provides a civil remedy for violations of the protection afforded
under the Privacy Protection Act, Judge Bright implied that the
remedy of damages was not sufficient to successfully prevent
searches and seizures of the press. 166 Therefore, if the purpose of
the Act is to prevent unnecessary searches and seizures, and the
remedy of damages does not guarantee the fulfillment of that pur
pose, Judge Bright concluded that Congress assumed that it was im
posing on the magistrate a procedural mandate to determine that a
warrant was appropriate under the terms of the Privacy Protection
Act. 167
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In Citicasters, both the majority and the dissent analyzed the
Privacy Protection Act and interpreted the intent of Congress in
their analyses. The majority, looking at the language of the Act,
believed that Congress intentionally refrained from imposing pro
cedures on state and local law enforcement officers in light of Tenth
Amendment I68 considerations, or in Judge Magill's words, in light
of "the proper restraints of federalism."169 The dissent, looking be
yond the language of the Act, believed that Congress assumed that
the procedures in question were a part of the warrant-seeking pro
cess, since the Act was meant to bolster constraints on law enforce
ment investigations involving non-suspects engaged in First
Amendment activities. 170 In part, both opinions relied on princi
ples of statutory interpretation. l71 Judge Magill, in the majority
After-the-fact review can only punish violation, not prevent it. Furthermore,
permitting an after-the-fact showing of what was "known" to the affiant but
not communicated to the magistrate judge contains too great a potential for
abuse; there could often be no assurance that the critical facts and details were
in fact known prior to the issuance of the warrant.
Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.3(a), at 459 (3d ed. 1996).
166. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. See id. (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
169. Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.6. See supra text accompanying note 134 for
the majority's language. See infra Part IV.B.5 for a discussion of Tenth Amendment
issues.
170. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See supra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of Judge Bright's dissent.
171. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the range of theories of statu
tory interpretation used by courts in their analyses of statutes. For a summary of the
prevailing theories, see Laura C. Edmonds, Note, The Fair Labor Standards Act-Anti
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opinion, stated his opposition to an exploration of the legislative
history if it could be avoided, and decided that in this case it
could.1 72 Judge Bright, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the ab
sence of procedural directives in the Act required a look at the stat
utory history and surrounding circumstances. 173
This Note asserts that the majority's interpretation of the stat
ute is correct, but that the statute, even with this interpretation,
may violate the Tenth Amendment. The dissent's interpretation of
the Act's silence may better accomplish Congress' stated goals in
passing the Act, but it imposes the federal hand into traditional
state police powers without explicit directives from Congress and in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. While the Privacy Protection
Act may be ineffective without the procedural requirement that a
magistrate rule on stated exceptions to the Act, because of constitu
tional considerations embodied in the Tenth Amendment, courts
should refrain from inferring that Congress intended such
procedures.
A.

Effective Enhancement of First and Fourth Amendment
Rights: Evidence Showing that Judge Bright is
(Partly) Right

Judge Bright's primary concern in his Citicasters dissent was
that the majority'S interpretation of the Privacy Protection Act un
dermined the Act's effectiveness in preventing the use of search
warrants when evidence was in the hands of non-suspects engaged
in First Amendment activities. Judge Bright concluded that the
Act's silence regarding the contested procedural issue was not in
tentional, but rather that Congress had neglected to outline the
magistrate's responsibilities in sufficient detail. 174 This section exPoverty Legislation in the Modern Era: Advocating Judicial Scrutiny Under a Feminist
Policy-Centered Analysis, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 229,242-49 (1997). For a discussion
of canons of construction, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
172. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1354-55. See supra notes 129-31 and accompany
ing text for a discussion of the majority's statements regarding statutory interpretation.
173. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1357-58 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissent
ing in part). See supra note 144 and accompanying text for Judge Bright's statutory
analysis.
174. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1357 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). While legislative inaction on an issue may be interpreted as evidence of legis
lative intent, silence about an issue can not be interpreted as inaction unless one knows
that the issue was discussed and dropped or not acted upon in some way. See WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 246-48 (1994).
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amines Judge Bright's rationale for his conclusion, and argues that
his concerns regarding congressional intent can be validated by an
examination of the Zurcher case, which inspired the Act, and other
issues discussed in the Act's legislative history.

1.

Silence as an Ambiguity

Judge Bright justified his examination of the legislative history
of the Privacy Protection Act and the contextual setting that
prompted its passage by saying that there was an "absence of proce
dural requirement[s]" in the Act that made the magistrate's precise
role in the process unclear. 175 His subsequent approach to the in
terpretation of this "absence" in the statute was to assume that he
must look to the Act's legislative history to discern what Congress
may have intended.
Courts regularly assume that silence in an act is intentional,
which results in an assumption that an issue that is not addressed is
intentionally not addressedY6 In some instances, however, courts
may assume that silence in an act reflects an unconsidered or ne
glected issue resulting in an ambiguity, which results in an examina
tion of other sources to determine probable congressional intent.1 77
If a court determines that a section of a statute is ambiguous, it will
next conduct an analysis of the entire statute, its legislative history,
and in some circumstances, as with Judge Bright, the context from
which the statute emerged, in an attempt to discern its intended
meaning. 178
175. Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1357-58 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
176. See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the Citicasters' majority treatment
of the absence of procedural provisions in the Privacy Protection Act as an intentional
act of Congress.
177. This approach is not without its critics. See Judge Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 59,
59 n.1 (1988) (praising Justice Scalia's comment that it is inappropriate "to speculate
upon what Congress would have said if it had spoken" in Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct.
1807, 1812 n.3 (1987»; Daniel L. Rotenberg, Essay, Congressional Silence in the
Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 375, 378 (1992) ("A search for clarity in legisla
tive records often proves difficult and sometimes futile. Application of this process to
what Congress has not said in order to tum nothing into something that is attributable
to Congress would assure a result based on either error or fiction.").
178. Sometimes a court will look to other sources, even if the language of the
statute is clear. See John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legisla
tive Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1985).
Grabow notes that in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laborato
ries, 460 U.S. 150, 157 (1983), the Court said, "[t)he plain language of the Act is control
ling unless a different legislative intent is apparent from the purpose and history of the
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The following sections expand on Judge Bright's discussions of
the context from which the Privacy Protection Act emerged, includ
ing the legislative history, and provide support for Judge Bright's
assertion that Congress was working from the assumption that a
magistrate would rule on all issues of probable cause, including the
belief that one of the exceptions to the Act established the need for
a search warrant.
2.
a.

The Purpose of the Act-Protecting First and Enhancing
Fourth Amendment Rights

The Zurcher context

Judge Bright pointed to the Zurcher Supreme Court opinion as
evidence to support his construction of the Act,179 Additional sup
port for his assertion comes from the district court opinion in
Zurcher, which sets forth a subpoena-first directive as well as ex
ceptions under which a search warrant might be appropriate when
seeking materials from non-suspects,180 Significantly, the district
court explicitly supported the affirmative role of the magistrate in
making a determination that not only were the Fourth Amendment
requirements of probable cause met, but also that urgent circum
stances existed that justified issuing a warrant for a search for docu
mentary materials on the premises of a press-related non-suspect,181
This framework provided a clear underpinning for the Act's provi
sions, but also illustrates the possible assumptions regarding
procedures.
b.

The structure of the Privacy Protection Act

The dissent correctly stated that the overall purpose of the Pri
vacy Protection Act, as a response to Zurcher, was to statutorily
Act." Grabow, supra, at 739. In support of this proposition, Grabow also references
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,20 (1983) ("If the statutory language is unambigu
ous, in the absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that lan
guage must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."'). Grabow, supra, at 739 n.9.
179. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1358 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See supra Part III for a discussion of Citicasters, and supra Part I.B for a
discussion of the Zurcher case.
180. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 134-35 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
affd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
181. See id. at 134. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the district court opinion. The district court stated that search warrants should rarely
be used with non-suspects, especially if First Amendment issues are implicated. The
court further stated that if a law enforcement officer thought it was essential, a sworn
affidavit must explicitly state that exigent circumstances precluded the use of a sub
poena. See Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. at 132-35.
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raise the standards of the Fourth Amendment to protect actions of
those engaged in First Amendment activities. 182 Without the dis
sent's construction of the statute, the standard has been raised very
little. The Act imposes a civil rather than a criminal penalty, and
since the Act does not provide for punitive damages, such penalties
will probably be minimal. I83 There is a complete "good faith de
fense" available to law enforcement officers, which facilitates post
hoc justification.1 84 Finally, there is complete judicial immunity,
which means that regardless of the role of the magistrates, they
bear no responsibility for properly enforcing the mandates of the
Act.18S
Congress presumed that a search warrant is inferior to a sub
poena in protecting innocent parties' privacy.186 Therefore, it
would be logical for Congress to structure the Act to effectively
prevent the use of search warrants. By requiring the agreement of
the neutral magistrate that an exception exists, it helps ensure first,
that law enforcement officers are consciously aware of the need to
comply with the subpoena-first presumption of the Privacy Protec
tion Act, and second, that the inferior tool of the search warrant is
used as infrequently as possible. This procedure helps ensure that
free speech is not inhibited due to fear of unwarranted intrusions by
police. When a non-suspect protected by the Privacy Protection
Act is presented with a search warrant, the fact that the judge has
issued it should be evidence that law enforcement officers have
complied with the Act. I87
182. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1358-59 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissent
ing in part); see also S. REp. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3950, 3950-51. For a discussion of the Zurcher case, see supra Part I.B.1.
183. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(a), (f) (1994); see also supra note 91 and accompa
nying text.
184. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(b); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
185. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(c). The provision for judicial immunity can be read
to support either the majority or the dissent's point of view. Under the majority's con
struction of the statute, the judicial role is divorced from compliance with the Act, since
the magistrate must merely rule on issues of probable cause. See supra Part III.C.1 for
a discussion of the majority opinion. Under the dissent's construction of the statute,
magistrates are not held responsible for the stated "reasonable belief' of law enforce
ment officers that one of the exceptions exists, making clear that the Act is meant to
modify the behavior of the police, not the judiciary. See supra Part III.C.2 for a discus
sion of the dissent's opinion.
186. See S. REP. No. 96-874, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950. For a
discussion of the Privacy Protection Act, see supra Part II.A.
187. Under the facts of Citicasters, since a subpoena was not available in a timely
fashion to the local police or the county prosecutor, the focus of the process was the
perceived urgent need to get the videotape from the station in order to identify the
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In addition to protecting rights of those engaged in First
Amendment activities, the Privacy Protection Act also bolsters
rights of private citizens beyond the protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment, or alternatively, acts as a substantive con
straint on law enforcement officers. 188 Law enforcement officers,
under the Fourth Amendment, must articulate "probable cause" by
oath or affidavit in order to secure a warrant. 189 Under the major
ity's construction of the Privacy Protection Act, there is no require
ment that law enforcement officers articulate their "reasonable
belief" or, in some cases, their "probable cause to believe" that the
conditions of one of the exceptions exist. 190 As Judge Bright points
out, while law enforcement officers are required to develop a rea
sonable belief that one of the exceptions to the Act exists before
they act, the only check on that belief is a civil suit instituted by an
injured party after the act has occurred. 191 As Judge Bright ob
served, this construction "pulls the teeth out of the statute."192 It is
more effective, when trying to discourage certain actions and en
courage others, to require proof that the preferred actions were
considered contemporaneously with the event rather than to allow
murderer. See Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill, 883 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 (W.D. Mo. 1995),
rev'd, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, the fact that a warrant was secured is not
prima facie evidence that the police were consciously attempting to comply with the
requirement that they have a "reasonable belief" that one of the exceptions to the Pri
vacy Protection Act existed that justified the use of a warrant over a subpoena. How
ever, at trial defendant McCaskill argued that the search and seizure of the videotape
fell under two exceptions to the Act. See id. at 1288. McCaskill argued that the search
warrant was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the witnesses to the
abduction, under 42 U.S.C § 2000aa(b)(2), and it was necessary in light of the reason
able belief of the law enforcement officers that the television station would destroy the
evidence, under 42 V.S.C § 2000aa(b)(3). See Citicasters, 883 F. Supp. at 1288.
188. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 1, 4-5, 9, reprinted in 1980 V.S.CCA.N. at 3950
51,3955.
189. The "probable cause" standard, according to Justice White in Zurcher, was
merely a showing of some belief that the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime
are located on the premises to be searched. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 V.S.
547, 556 (1978).
190. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1356, 1360 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dis
senting in part). See supra note 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the excep
tions contained in 42 V.S.C § 2000aa(a)-(b).
191. Law enforcement officers, if sued personally (as in Citicasters), are relieved
of liability if they can show, after the fact, that they "reasonably believed" an exception
to the Act existed. See 42 V.S.C § 2000aa-6(b) (describing the availability of a "good
faith defense"); see also Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1357 (remanding the case to the district
court to determine whether County Prosecutor McCaskill "possessed a reasonable be
lief that an exception to the Privacy Protection Act existed").
192. Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1360 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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justification for the actions actually taken to be developed after the
event has occurred.
The impetus for the Privacy Protection Act was the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher. In that context, there is evidence that
the framework of the Act assumed an affirmative role for the mag
istrate. In addition, Judge Bright's observations correctly under
score that the majority's construction of the Act does not effectively
solve the problems presented by the Court's ruling in Zurcher. Fur
thermore, the dissent found direct references to support this conclu
sion in the Act's legislative history.
3. The Legislative History of the Privacy Protection Act
The dissent in Citicasters noted that the Senate Report drafters
appear to have assumed that a magistrate would rule both on the
probable cause that the materials being sought would be found on
the premises for which a warrant was requested, and on the officer's
reasonable belief that one of the exceptions to the Privacy Protec
tion Act applied.1 93 Judge Bright supported this conclusion by cit
ing specific language in the Senate Report. 194
In fact, it is hard to know what was assumed and what was
merely overlooked. The Act was not passed after a hard-fought
193. See id. at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); S. REp.
No. 96·874, at 11, 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3957, 3959. See supra notes
156-58 and accompanying text for Judge Bright's discussion of the Senate Report.
194. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1359 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). There are three places where the Senate Report drafters made the assumption
that the Act addresses the obligations of law enforcement officers when seeking a
warrant:
This statute recognizes this distinction [between suspects and non-suspects],
but, in light of the importance of protecting First Amendment values, it places
a heavy burden on law enforcement officers wishing to invoke the suspect ex
ception ... by requiring that they show probable cause to believe that the per
son possessing the materials has committed ... the criminal offense for which
the materials are sought.
S. REp. No. 96-874, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3957 (emphasis added).
"Among the factors which the [Senate Judiciary] Committee believes might be
considered by a magistrate in determining whether materials might be destroyed are
evidence of a close personal, family or business relationship between the person in pos
session of the material with a person who is a suspect ...." [d. at 13, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.AN. at 3959 (emphasis added). "The committee in adopting [the language of
the Privacy Protection Act] is, in effect, instructing magistrates and others empowered
to issue warrants that a search directed at the documentary materials of journalists is to
be considered in itself "unreasonable" in the absence of enumerated circumstances."
Id. at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3968 (additional views of Senators Orrin
Hatch and Alan Simpson).
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battle, but had a great deal of consensus from the start.1 95 The prin
cipal conflict of its enactment was not over procedural issues, but
concerned the circumstances under which the exceptions to the sub
poena requirement would apply.196 There were relatively few dis
cussions about procedures and they do not appear to have been
controversial or contested. 197 There was no discussion which would
indicate Congress specifically intended that failure to articulate
which exception was prompting a law enforcement officer to apply
for a warrant would constitute a violation of the Act.
However, congressional hearings refer to procedural aspects of
the Act. The principal drafter of the statute, Justice Department
Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann, stated in a hearing
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that he envisioned a proce
dure where the investigator would specifically state, in the affidavit
for the search warrant, which exception to the Privacy Protection
Act applied.1 98 In this testimony, Heymann described exactly that
which Judge Bright envisioned: a neutral magistrate or judge ruling
on the law enforcement officer's stated exceptions to the ACt. 199
In addition, testimony from interested parties during congres
sional hearings establishes that at least some readers of the bill as
sumed a magistrate would rule on the appropriateness of issuing the
warrant under the Act.2°o In an early hearing before the Senate
195. See generally S. REP. No. 96-874 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN.
3950.
196. The issue of whether the Act should cover all third party non-suspects or just
those involved in First Amendment issues was much contested and discussed. See id. at
8-9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3954-55.
197. See id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. at 3954-55.
198. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 43-44 (statement of
Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Jus
tice, in response to questions from bill sponsor Senator Max Bacchus); see also infra
note 199 and accompanying text.
199. Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart
ment of Justice, stated the following at a Senate Committee on the Judiciary Hearing:
We would have to, if it were documents or work product of somebody holding
them for future publication ... numerate and give evidence of the particular
exception that we were invoking. That would just be put in the affidavit.
The magistrate would either find that that was met or not. If the magis
trate found that it was met, he or she would issue a warrant.
Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 43-44 (excerpt to response from
questions from Senator Max Baucus about the search warrant process envisioned at the
Federal level). Heymann chaired a task force created at the order of President Carter
to look into the administrative response to the Zurcher holding. Heymann wrote most
of the language that was incorporated into the final bill. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on
the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 329 (testimony of Philip Heymann).
200. For example, in commenting on the bill that was passed, the National News
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Subcommittee on the Constitution, Sam Dash, Professor at Ge
orgetown University Law Center, testified as follows:
[A]ll you are really doing is adding another element to the deter
mination by a magistrate of probable cause .... [I]n a situation
involving an innocent third party ... [the police] can go to a
magistrate and make [the] case to a magistrate .... [I]f he can
get a magistrate to agree with him that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the evidence might be destroyed, then you
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment [sic]. I suggest
that was absent in [Zurcher]. There was no such showing made
before a magistrate. 2ol

Professor Dash suggested that Zurcher was decided wrongly be
cause there was no evidence that the police had, in their application
for a search warrant, sought the warrant upon a showing of prob
able cause to believe that the evidence would be.destroyed if a sub
poena had been sought. 202 At the same hearing, Senator Mathias
submitted a set of questions which made it clear that he assumed a
paper Association submitted its testimony to the Judiciary Committee and included in
the hearings record the statement that "use of the term 'reason to believe' ... [in the
exceptions section of the Act ] leaves too much latitude to magistrates and judges." Sen
ate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 166 (Letter from Arthur B. Sackler,
General Counsel, National Newspaper Association). The "reason to believe" section
was interpreted by the Citicasters majority to refer to the law enforcement officer, not
the magistrate. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1357 (1996).
In a 1979 Hearing before the House Subcommittee on the Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice, of the Committee on the Judiciary, Representative
Lamar Gudger from North Carolina, when questioning Philip Heymann about an early
draft of the bill, stated the following:
I assume that the process to be pursued would be that the application to the
magistrate would set forth an assertion that these four exceptions did not ap
ply in the instance under investigation, but that the ... publishing house to be
searched, would be able to contest that negative assertion in the application
for the search warrant.
1979 House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 26 (questioning of
Philip Heymann, Department of Justice, by Representative Gudger-Heymann an
swered only that in most cases magistrates would issue an ex parte warrant, rather than
creating a procedure where non-suspects could contest the contents of the affidavit).
Also, John H.F. Shattuck, Washington Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, in his testimony to the same committee said "[t]he purpose of the legislation
proposed by Senator Bayh and others is to prohibit third party searches unless a judge
makes a finding of probable cause that the persons in possession of the evidence sought
may be involved in the crime under investigation or would destroy the evidence." 1979
House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 49 (statement of John H.F.
Shattuck, Washington Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
201. 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 64-65
(testimony of Sam Dash, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington,
D.c.).
202. See id. at 65.
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magistrate would make the probable cause finding for both the
place and particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and
for the reasons to be justified under the Privacy Protection Act
e.g., whether the evidence would be destroyed. 203 Finally, the three
bills considered in the Senate judiciary Committee differed in who
was to be covered by the act. 204 One of the unsuccessful bills had
an explicit provision that a magistrate would rule on exceptions ar
ticulated by the officer seeking a warrant. 205
In conclusion, in the relatively few places in which there was
discussion of the issue of the role of the magistrate in the process of
issuing a warrant as an exception to the Privacy Protection Act,
members of Congress and other participants in the legislative pro
cess assumed that a magistrate would make the determination that
an exception had been met. This evidence supports Judge Bright's
construction of the Act.
However, even with evidence that Congress and participants in
the legislative process may have intended to provide an affirmative
role for the magistrate in ensuring compliance with the Act's direc
tives, and with evidence that the dissent's construction of the Act is
a more effective method for ensuring the protection of First
Amendment rights and enhancing Fourth Amendment rights, this
Note asserts that the dissent's foray beyond the language of the
statute is inappropriate in this circumstance. First, there is ample
evidence that Congress intended the majority's construction of the
Act. Second, even if the dissent's evidence is compelling, when the
unresolved issue involves federal intrusion into traditionally state
controlled activities, the courts should not impose duties on the
states unless Congress has specifically so directed. Finally, under
recent Supreme Court interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, the
dissent's interpretation of the statute is probably unconstitutional.
The dissent's assertion that the Act is weakened by the major
ity's reading of the text is correct. Congress passed the Privacy Pro
tection Act in response to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,206 wherein the
Supreme Court articulated an expansive view of the power of the
203. See id. at 121 (questions submitted by Senator Mathias).
204. See S. 115, S. 1790, and S. 1816, 96th Congo (1980), reprinted in Senate Judici
ary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 11-30. See supra notes 81-84 for a discussion of
these bills.
205. See supra note 79 for the relevant provisions of S. 115, proposed by Senator
Charles Mathias, Jr.
206. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See Part I.B for a discussion of the Zurcher case.
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government under the Fourth Amendment. 207 Because of
Zurcher, Congress wanted to restrict the ability of criminal investi
gators to utilize a search warrant under a particular set of circum
stances. 208 The dissent's interpretation of the text inserts a pre
search check on the judgment of investigators, rather than relying
on post-search lawsuits, and is thus a more effective method of pro
tecting innocent parties engaged in First Amendment activities.

B.

The Tenth Amendment and the Clear Statement Rule: Why
the Majority is Right

The majority opinion in Citicasters is based on the premise that
the absence of procedural provisions in the Privacy Protection Act
was intentional. In addition to looking at the language of the Act,
the majority noted that the procedural guidelines promulgated by
the Department of Justice, as required by Subchapter II of the Act,
which supplement but do not supplant the Act, explicitly place the
decision that an exception to the Act exists in the Department of
Justice, and do not require any statements in the warrant affida
vit. 209 Further, the majority found that Congress structured the Act
so that concern over being sued would force law enforcement of
ficers to comply with the substantive elements of the Act, and that
Congress thus did not need to impose "elaborate procedural re
quirements."210 Finally, the majority opined that Congress was
consciously avoiding interfering with state law enforcement proce
dures, choosing only to provide the substance of the law. 211 The
majority examined the text of the statute as a whole and the Attor
ney General's Guidelines promulgated under the Act to support its
conclusion. In addition to the issues cited by the majority, the simi
lar construction of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 bolsters the majority's conclusion that state law en
forcement procedure before state magistrates was intentionally
omitted from the ACt. 212 Ultimately, it is the majority's passing
207. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3950,
3950-51.
208. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950-51.
209. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996). See
supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Attorney General's
Guidelines.
210. Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355.
211. See id. at 1355 n.6.
212. See 18 u.s.c. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). See Part IV.B.4 for a discussion of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
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mention of federalism that provides the strongest argument sup
porting its conclusion.
1.

"Silence" as Intentional Congressional Restraint

Unlike the dissent, which found that the absence of procedural
directives in the. Act compelled an examination of the legislative
history for Congress' intended meaning, the majority found mean
ing in Congress' silence. 213 Absent a specific provision that law en
forcement officers must articulate the reason for seeking a warrant
rather than using a subpoena when seeking evidence from non-sus
pects who are involved in First Amendment activities, the majority
was disinclined to infer that such a provision was intended. 214 Fur
ther, the majority found that details regarding warrant procedure
were addressed in another part of the Act, and inferred that Con
gress had included all the details of procedure that were considered
necessary.215
213. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1354-55. Rather than focusing on the traditional
canon of construction that silence is presumed to be intentional, the majority cited
Supreme Court precedent for its pronouncement that if the statute is clear, the courts
must follow the clear mandate of Congress. See id. The majority argued that the si
lence has clear meaning since the search warrant process was modified in other parts of
the Act. See id. at 1355 n.6. See supra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of the majority
opinion in Citicasters. For examples of traditional interpretation of silence in a statute,
see Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1981) (rejecting petitioners' charac
terization of silence as an "ambiguity" and asserting that "if anything is to be assumed
from the congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware ... [of a rule
of construction] and legislated with it in mind"); Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Ex
change, Inc., 98 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "legislative silence counts
for nothing," and while ambiguous clauses in statutes can be cleared up by looking to
the legislative history, unless there is a technical error in the statute, silence is presumed
to be intentional); and In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Pelkowski
seeks to find a statutory ambiguity from the statute's silence. We see no reason to
create an ambiguity. If Congress had intended that section ... not [to] apply ... we
assume that it would have so stated.").
For a further discussion of interpreting statutory silence, see Laurence H. Tribe,
Judicial Interpretation ofStatutes: Three Axioms, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 51 (1988).
Professor Tribe argues that when interpreting statutes, the search "must be not for a
subjective, unenacted intent but for an objective, enacted meaning of a legal text." ld.
But see Rotenberg, supra note 177, at 386, for a discussion of the variety of meanings
that congressional silence can import. "Actual silence ... can mean at one extreme that
during the legislative process no one thought of the issue and thus no one spoke of it or
at the other extreme that Congress so obviously included the issue in the law that no
comment was called for." Id.
214. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1354.
215. See id. at 1355 n.6; see also 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(b)(4)(B), (c) (1994 & Supp. II
1996). In § 2000aa(c), if law enforcement officers are seeking a warrant pursuant to the
exception outlined in § 2000aa(b)(4)(B), the person possessing the materials sought can
submit an affidavit arguing that the materials sought should not be subject to seizure.
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However, the majority did not merely rest on the traditional
statutory canon to conclude that congressional silence was inten
tional. The majority found evidence that Congress intended to re
frain from specifying that the law enforcement officer must state
the exception under which a warrant was being sought, and that
therefore, the only probable cause ruling needed from the magis
trate was that the materials sought would be found on the preririses
to be searched.
The following subsections provide evidence found in the legis
lative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the
Privacy Protection Act, which support the majority's construction
of the statute.
2.

The Attorney General's Guidelines

Judge Magill, writing for the majority in Citicasters, noted that
the federal regulatory guidelines, entitled "Guidelines on Methods
of Obtaining Materials Held by Third Parties," promulgated pursu
ant to the Privacy Protection Act, prescribe federal agent proce
dures when seeking documentary evidence from any type of non
suspect in a criminal investigation. 216 Under those guidelines, fed
eral agents must comply with the Act, and the Department compels
the law enforcement agent to justify the requirement for a search
warrant inside the agency.217 In fact, the Guidelines clearly impleSee 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(c). Section 2000aa(b)(4)(B) provides that a warrant may be
sought if a person possesses materials that they would not produce pursuant to a sub
poena, and "there is reason to believe" that the interests of justice would be threatened
by further proceedings relating to the subpoena. Id. § 2000aa(b)(4)(B). See supra Part
ILA for a discussion of the provisions of the Privacy Protection Act.
216. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 59.1-.6 (1997). See supra Part II.B for a description of the
Attorney General's Guidelines.
217. See Citicasters, 89 F.3d at 1355 n.6. In addition, in early testimony before
the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Philip Heymann, Deputy Assistant At
torney General in the Department of Justice, indicated that he was at that time leaning
toward having Federal agents make probable cause determinations as to whether a
search warrant was appropriate under the Act because of their expertise. See 1978
Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 42-43, 59. A year
later, in testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he indicated that a magistrate
should make such a ruling. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 43;
see also 126 CONGo REc. 26,563 (1980) (comments of Senator Kastenmeier). In discuss
ing final revisions made to the Privacy Protection bill, Senator Kastenmeier stated the
following:
[T]he Attorney General ... desired more flexibility in developing procedures
for searches of other third parties .... The essential difference between [this
bill] and the original reported version is that it makes the decision to apply for
a warrant for a third party search an administrative matter to be handled
solely within the Department of Justice, acting pursuant to statutory guide
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ment the procedural safeguards within the Justice Department,218
Once internal approval is obtained, then the agent may apply for a
warrant. 219 With this internal procedural safeguard at the federal
level, there is arguably no need for an additional layer of justifica
tion in the application for a warrant. The Department of Justice's
articulation of the internal procedures needed to comply with the
Act can be interpreted to support the majority's inference that the
Act did not require a magistrate to have a role in determining
whether the law enforcement officer reasonably believed an excep
tion to the Act had been met,220
3.

The Role of the Department of Justice in Passing the
Privacy Protection Act

While the majority opinion did not examine the legislative his
tory of the Privacy Protection Act, the history does add further sup
port to the majority's conclusion. Given that the language of the
statute was actually drafted by officials in the Department of Jus
tice,221 those drafters may have fully intended to leave procedural
requirements out. First, they may have felt that at the federal level,
the expertise existed inside the Justice Department to make the de
cisions as to whether an exception had been met. 222 In addition, the
principal drafter, Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General of
the Department of Justice, testified at a Senate Judiciary Commit
tee hearing that the Justice Department was generally "concerned
lines, rather than a judicial matter, requiring the supervision of the judge issu
ing the warrant.

Id.
218. See 28 c.P.R. §§ 59.1-.6. See supra note 97-101 and accompanying text for a
description of the provisions of the Guidelines.
219. See 28 c.P.R. § 59.4.
220. On the other hand, the structure of the Guidelines also supports the dissent's
view. If the Guidelines, with their emphasis on internal articulation of the exceptions to
the Act, are more liberal than the provisions of the Act, it helps explain why the Justice
Department argued so strenuously for a narrow, "press-only" bill. Under this line of
thinking, the Justice Department, as principal author of the bill that eventually passed,
fought a broad bill applicable to all third parties searched because it wanted to be free
to adopt less restrictive procedures for non-press third party searches prescribed in the
Guidelines. It would help explain the Department's insistence on the press-only bill if it
would gain greater independence through procedures developed by its own guidelines.
221. See 126 CONGo REC. 26,563 (1980) (comments of Senator Kastenmeier); see
also Remarks of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant United States Attorney General (May
1979), in Rights, Privileges, and Power a/the Press, 1 COMM. & L. 1,25-26 (1979) (panel
discussion with representatives of the press at the annual judicial conference of the
Second Circuit of the United States).
222. See supra note 217.
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about the problems of federalism."223 However, by limiting the ap
plication to the press and grounding the bill on the Commerce
Clause, "there is no reason to worry or be ashamed of the fact that
our bill would reach State officials" by imposing procedures on
state and local law enforcement agencies. 224 Given that he did ex
press concerns about federalism, the language he drafted should
have consciously articulated all procedures to be imposed on states,
such as the requirement for a subpoena-first preference. Any pro
cedures left out, arguably, were left out intentionally.
Other speakers at the same Judiciary Committee hearing spoke
about the many different sets of criminal procedure laws around the
country.225 They were concerned about the ability of the federal
government to accommodate the differing ways of issuing subpoe
nas and search warrants in the provisions of any bill passed. 226
Viewing the statute with this in mind, the Act may have been struc
tured to sidestep conflicts with existing criminal procedure laws. To
effect this goal, the absence of procedural language may have been
intentional.
Thus, the majority could have bolstered its argument with the
fact that the legislation was drafted by law enforcement officers
seeking to maintain as much control as possible for law enforce
ment agents while still enhancing protection of non-suspects with
criminal evidence.227 Under the majority's construction of the stat
ute, the control is maintained in the face of a strong presumption in
favor of a subpoena by allowing the law enforcement officer to
make a determination that an exception to the presumption of a
subpoena allows the use of a search warrant. While this construc
tion of the statute creates a very weak method for curbing law en
forcement powers, relying primarily on self-enforcement, the
majority noted that "it is not for the federal courts to redraft legisla
tion merely because we would have selected different [enforce
ment] procedures."228
223. 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 333-34
(statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart
ment of Justice).
224. Id.; see also S. REp. No. 96-874, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3950, 3964-65.
225. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at
413-14 (comments of Richard N. Gottfried, Assemblyman, New York State Assembly
Chair of Codes Committee).
226. See id.
227. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 8-9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3955.
228. Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1355 (8th Cir. 1996). However, to
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Title III Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

A comparison of the Privacy Protection Act with the Omnibus
C~ime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968229 ("Title III") provides
further support for the majority's construction of the Privacy Pro
tection Act. Title III was often cited in congressional hearings both
as a model for the design of the Privacy Protection Act and as the
only other example of congressional action to regulate state and
local police activity on Fourth Amendment issues. 23o Title III is in
tended to prohibit unconsented wiretapping of private parties and
regulate and limit the use of wiretapping by law enforcement of
ficers. 231 As with the Privacy Protection Act, Congress found the
authority to regulate state and local law enforcement procedure
through the use of the Commerce Clause. 232 In ,Title III, Congress
requires that federal, state, and local law enforcement officers desir
ing to wiretap apply for an order from a federal or state judge. 233
counter this view, a report given to the House Committee on Government Operations
concluded that warrants are issued perfunctorily with little probing judicial inquiry. See
H.R. REP. No. 95-1521, at 4 n.7 (1978). The performance of magistrates under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 illustrates this. Between 1969 and
1976, magistrates denied only 15 of 5,563 police request for warrants under the Act. See
id. In 1977, magistrates approved all 626 applications for warrants. See id. If warrants
are not subject to close scrutiny by magistrates, then resolving the contested provision
to favor the dissent's position would not add any meaningful security to those protected
by the Privacy Protection Act.
229. 18 U.S.c. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). For a discussion of the history of the Act, see
Thomas Garcia, Note, In re United States-Should Federal Magistrates Be Delegated
the Authority to Approve Electronic Surveillance Applications?, 18 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 271 (1996); Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should
Add Electronic Communication to Title Ill's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly
Reject a "Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (1997).
230. For example, acting as advocates for passing a privacy protection bill in hear
ings before the 1979 House Subcommittee on the Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad
ministration of Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union concluded that Congress
had the right to regulate state and local police procedures, and had done so in Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See 1979 House Sub
comm. on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 49 (statement of John H.F. Shattuck,
Washington Director, American Civil Liberties Union).
231. See 18 U.S.c. § 2510.
232. See id. The purpose of the Act is described as follows:
(b) In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communica
tions, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to
prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to
define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized, to prohibit
any unauthorized interception of such communications, and the use of the
contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings.
Id.
233. See id. § 2518.
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The judge must make a finding of probable cause to believe that:
the individual is involved in a crime for which a wiretap is allowed,
relevant information will be obtained from the wiretap, normal pro
cedures have been exhausted, and the location to be tapped is used
by the suspect. 234
The purpose of the Privacy Protection Act echoes that of Title
III in some respects. Specifically, both are designed to limit inva
sive procedures by law enforcement officers and enumerate excep
tions under which such officers may seek to use the invasive
procedures. 235 Reflecting this, the two acts have a similar structure.
While they differ substantivelY,236 because Title III was cited as a
model for the Privacy Protection Act, the procedural differences
between the two acts are instructive. Most significantly, the Privacy
Protection Act does not contain Title Ill's specific procedural sec
tion with language stating that judges must find, for example,
"probable cause for a belief that an individual is committing ... a
particular offense enumerated [in another section of the Act]"
before a search warrant can be issued.237 While Title III describes
234. See id. §§ 2511,2516,2518. The statute requires that law enforcement agents
desiring to wiretap get authorization from an Attorney General or Assistant Attorney
General at the federal level to apply to a judge for an authorizing order. See id.
§ 2516(1). An officer must request that the "principal prosecuting attorney" at the state
or local level apply to a state court judge for an authorizing order. Id. § 2516(2). A
section of the Act is devoted to a "[p]rocedure for interception of wire or oral commu
nications." It specifies in detail the application requirements for an authorizing order,
and specifies also the specific findings the judge must make. See id. § 2518(3).
235. In the Privacy Protection Act, the conditions which permit an exception to
the subpoena first rule are as follows: if the person possessing the evidentiary material
is a criminal suspect in the matter, if seizing the materials will prevent serious harm to
others, if there is reason to believe the materials will be destroyed, or if all other reme
dies have been exhausted. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). In
Title III, the conditions which permit an exception to the prohibition against wiretaps
are the following: if the person is involved in a crime for which wiretaps are allowed
(listed in the Act), if relevant information will be obtained from the wiretap, if normal
procedures have been exhausted, and if the location to be tapped is used by the suspect.
See 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3).
Wiretapping is an extremely invasive procedure, more invasive and continual than
a one-time search. Stricter procedures are appropriate. See Garcia, supra note 229, at
301.
236. The Privacy Protection Act seeks to limit the use of a search warrant in favor
of a subpoena. Title III seeks to limit the use of an even more invasive evidence-gather
ing technique, the wiretap, and requires a search warrant in order to procure permission
for its use.
237. 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3)(a). In addition, the Privacy Protection Act does not con
tain Title Ill's exclusionary rule. Thus, under the Privacy Protection Act, even material
gathered through the use of a warrant obtained in violation of the Act will not be ex
cluded for use in a trial. However, under the Privacy Protection Act, the material has
been collected from non-suspects. Compare 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(e), with 18 U.S.c.
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the findings the judge must make, the Privacy Protection Act does
not. 238 In fact, the only mention of judicial officers in the Privacy
Protection Act is its explicit provision of immunity for them. 239 Fi
nally, the Privacy Protection Act provides a complete good faith
defense when government officers are sued personally, if an officer
"had a reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his con
duct."24o Title Ill's good faith defense provisions, by contrast, come
into play when the person sued can prove a "good faith reliance on
a court order."241 Contrasting these provisions, since the Privacy
Protection Act's good faith defense is based solely on an officer's
good faith reliance on his own beliefs, it would follow that the Act
presumes that the decision to seek a warrant under one of the Act's
exceptions is based solely on the judgment of a law enforcement
officer.
The conspicuous modelling of the Privacy Protection Act on
Title III and the absence of the articulated probable cause determi
nation by the judiciary regarding the applicability of an exception,
as well as the differing good faith defense provisions, provide evi
dence that the omission of the judicial role in the Privacy Protection
Act was intentional and not an oversight. This provides further
support for the majority's position in Citicasters.
5.

a.

Tenth Amendment Concerns of the Majority

Legislative history and the Tenth Amendment

The majority in Citicasters argued that procedural issues were
omitted intentionally in the Privacy Protection Act to avoid exces
sive imposition on state law enforcement procedures. 242 The legis
lative history offers support for the majority's conclusion regarding
procedural issues. For example, the Senate Report reveals that
some senators had "serious constitutional and policy questions
about congressional authority to impose law enforcement proce
§ 2515. Both acts provide a civil cause of action with similar damage provisions; how
ever, the Privacy Protection Act specifically authorizes suit against the Federal govern
ment and other governmental entities, whereas Title III authorizes suits against "any
person," but does not provide blanket authorization to sue the Federal or state govern
ments. Compare 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(a), with 18 U.S.c. § 2520.
238. See 18 U.S.c. § 2518(3).
239. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(c). Presumably, however, common law judicial im
munity would be available to judges or magistrates under Title III.
240. 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa-6(b).
241. 18 U.S.c. § 2520(d)(I).
242. See Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1355 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996).
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dures on the states."243 At the first hearing on legislation proposed
in response to Zurcher, speakers expressed concern over a statute
that would intrude into areas of traditional state control.244
Many of the bills proposed in response to Zurcher based con
gressional authority on the Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amend
ment under the theory that the Fifth Section explicitly gave
Congress the power to regulate states in the name of protection of
constitutional rights. 245 Nevertheless, Philip Heymann, speaking
for the committee that drafted the Act, was extremely reluctant to
use the Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of
congressional authority.246 In Zurcher, the Supreme Court had ex
243. S. REp. No. 96-874, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950, 3964
65. In addition, such concerns were expressed by numerous witnesses in early hearings.
See, e.g., 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 61 (tes
timony of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart
ment of Justice); id. at 121-24 (testimony of John H. Shattuck, Director, American Civil
Liberties Union); id. at 325 (testimony of James B. Zagel, Executive Director, Illinois
Law Enforcement Commission); id. at 375 (testimony of William Cohen, Professor,
Stanford University Law School).
Concerns about congressional authority to impose law enforcement procedures on
the states were also expressed by some Congressman who proposed bills applying to
federal law enforcement officers only. See, e.g., H.R. 1373, H.R. 1305, and H.R. 322,
96th Congo (1979).
244. For example, in Philip Heymann's first testimony on June 22, 1978, before
the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, he stated the following:
National legislation may be a subject of slightly more concern in this par
ticular case because law enforcement procedure is an area where Congress has
gone out of its way to leave the States considerable freedom after they satisfy
their constitutional obligations. There is an exception to Congress' restraint in
this area: the wiretap statute is a Federal law regulating the States. But it is
the only exception. Law enforcement is near the heart of State powers.
1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 44 (testimony of
Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice).
245. For examples of bills using the First and Fifth sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to justify congressional involvement in such traditionally locally controlled
operations, see S. 1364, 95th Congo (1978), reprinted in 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the
Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 4; S. 115 and S. 1816 96th Congo (1980), re
printed in Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra note 74, at 11, 27.
The Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 5. This section is the enforcement clause for the First Sec
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourteenth Amend
ment debate during the legislative hearings for the Privacy Protection Act.
246. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 44
(testimony of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Depart
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pressly ruled that the search undertaken by the Palo Alto police did
not violate First or Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, some ar
gued that Congress could not legitimately pass an act protecting
rights that the Court had expressly stated did not exist. 247 As a re
sult, the legislation that passed was instead tied to the Commerce
Clause and limited to persons engaged in First Amendment activi
ties, on the theory that persons with an intent to disseminate mater
ials would engage in interstate commerce. 248 Because congressional
authority to pass the Act was finally based on the Commerce
Clause, it is possible that Congress did not insert detailed proce
dural provisions for fear that they would exceed the authority the
Commerce Clause provided. 249
ment of Justice). See supra note 245 for the relevant language of the First and Fifth
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
247. A countervailing viewpoint was expressed by John H.F. Shattuck, Washing
ton Director, American Civil Liberties Union at the Senate Subcommittee on the Con
stitution Hearings. He argued that in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966),
the Court ruled that the Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the
same powers as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. See
1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at 111 (testimony of
John H.F. Shattuck). In Katzenbach, he argued, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shattuck argued that the
Privacy Protection Act is also a valid exercise of congressional power under that
amendment, protecting First and Fourth Amendment rights. He stated that "the States
are nowhere in the Constitution given explicit authorization to regulate police prac
tices," and that "police procedures have been uniformly regulated on a national basis
by Congress." Id. at 111-12. Therefore, he swept aside Tenth Amendment concerns.
But see supra note 83 for the Justice Department's argument that this would be too
broad a reading of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and for a citation to a recent Supreme Court decision supporting the Justice Depart
ment's argument.
248. See 1978 Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution Hearings, supra note 66, at
333-34; see also supra note 83.
249. At the time of consideration of the Privacy Protection Act, the Supreme
Court had recently examined the limitations of congressional power over traditional
state functions through the use of the Commerce Clause in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In that opinion, the Court ruled that Congress could not
intrude into traditional state functions, left to states by the Tenth Amendment, in the
. name of the regulation of commerce. While National League has since been overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), from
1978 to 1980, when the Privacy Protection Act provisions were being debated, Congress
was aware of judicially imposed limits on the Commerce Clause, based on the powers
reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment.
In the opinion of a representative from the American Civil Liberties Union, Con
gress was authorized to impose minimum standards that could be related to the Com
merce Clause on the states, but should not impose "elaborate procedures" on a state
court system. See 1979 House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 58
(testimony of John H.F. Shattuck, Washington Director, American Civil Liberties

1998]

PROBING THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

483

Speakers at congressional hearings also questioned the practi
cality of imposing specific procedures at the state and locallevels. 250
Many states, like Missouri in Citicasters, did not have subpoena
procedures available to law enforcement officers in the investiga
tive stage of a criminal proceeding. 251 If Congress did have the
power to enact a law that specified procedures for the procurement
of a search warrant at the state and local level, some states would
be forced to adopt new procedures to effectuate the law. 252
Thus, Congress had a substantive goal with potential proce
dural problems. To address this problem, the Act created a one
year grace period before provisions that affected a state took ef
fect. 253 Congress intended to give the states the ability to adapt
their own procedures to the requirements of the law. 254

b.

Analysis of the Privacy Protection Act under the
Commerce Clause
The majority in Citicasters remarked on "the proper restraints

Union). He cited the Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities saying that
"there are [some] attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress." 1979 House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing,
supra note 68, at 47 (testimony of John H.F. Shattuck, Washington Director, American
Civil Liberties Union (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845)).
250. See 1979 House Subcomm. on the Courts Hearing, supra note 68, at 58 (testi
mony of John H.F. Shattuck, Washington Director, American Civil Liberties Union);
id. at 102 (testimony of Charles W. Bailey, Editor of the Minneapolis Tribune, on behalf
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors).
251. See id. at 102 (testimony of Charles W. Bailey, Editor of the Minneapolis
Tribune, on behalf of the American Society of Newspaper Editors).
252. Under current Supreme Court analysis, an implied compulsion by Congress
that states must legislate might itself implicate the Tenth Amendment, as overt compul
sion to legislate is unconstitutional. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
253. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa (1994). The Statutory Notes accompanying the Pri
vacy Protection Act state the following:
1980 Acts: ... The provisions of this title shall become effective January 1,
1981, except that insofar as such provisions are applicable to a State or any
governmental unit other than the United States, the provisions of this section
shall become effective one year from the date of enactment of this Act [Oct.
13, 1980].
Id. (emphasis added).
254. See S. REp. No. 96-874, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950,
3964. In written testimony submitted to the full Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
Richard Williams, County Prosecutor for Atlantic County New Jersey and Vice Presi
dent of the National District Attorneys Association, suggested that a two year delay
before implementation of the act would be "more realistic" to "permit possible modifi
cations of state criminal justice procedures." Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearings, supra
note 74, at 161.
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of federalism."255 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have re
examined the issue of federalism, particularly in terms of the limita
tions the Tenth Amendment places on Congress' ability to regulate
areas of traditional state control through the Commerce Clause. 256
While Congress assumed it had the power to pass the Privacy
Protection Act under the Commerce Clause at the time of its pas
sage, the Privacy Protection Act is also, arguably, within the more
restrictive current parameters of the Commerce Clause. It specifi
cally protects persons who intend to communicate their ideas to the
public, whereby such communications enter the stream of com
merce. 257 In United States v. Lopez ,258 the Supreme Court defined
three permissible categories of activities which Congress could reg
ulate or protect under its Commerce Clause power: (1) use of the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of, or
persons or things in, interstate commerce; and (3) activities having a
"substantial relation" to interstate commerce.259 The Privacy Pro
tection Act fits most comfortably into the second category, by pro
tecting persons or things involved in interstate commerce through
the use of its prescribed procedures. 26o In addition, the press and
255. Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350, 1355 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996).
256. These decisions came after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au
thority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (hold
ing that Congress may not compel the states to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a federal law mak
ing illegal the possession of guns near schools was outside the scope of the Commerce
Clause-and impliedly violated the Tenth Amendment by intruding on powers reserved
for the states); United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (hold
ing that states, conversely, may not impose term limits for members of Congress-that
is not a power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment); Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that a federal law requiring that mandatory background
checks on applicants for firearms be undertaken by state or local law enforcement of
ficers is unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment because it requires state officers
to "administer or enforce a federal regulatory program"). These decisions indicate that
the Supreme Court is taking more seriously the requirement that laws have a substan
tial economic affect on interstate commerce, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559, and protecting
powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. See supra note 249 for a dis
cussion of Garcia and prior holdings.
257. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the provi
sions of the Privacy Protection Act.
258. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
259. Id. at 558-59.
260. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa(a)-(b). Courts have recently upheld the constitution
ality of a federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), under the
Commerce Clause with similar reasoning, i.e., that the statute protects the travel of
interstate travellers or regulates an item in interstate commerce. See United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 588-90 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 236
37 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995). Other courts
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other modes of communication appear to be instrumentalities of
commerce, which Congress may also protect.
Alternatively, the Act fits into the third category defined by
the Supreme Court, which allows Congress to regulate activities
having a "substantial relationship" to interstate commerce. The
Privacy Protection Act regulates criminal law enforcement proce
dures that substantially affect the operation of press activities; by
using search warrants when seeking documentary evidence, law en
forcement officers disrupt the efficient workings of the press. 261
However, defining the Act's relationship to the Commerce Clause
in this way, underscores that Congress is directly regulating the ac
tions of state and local law enforcement agencies as both a means
and an end, and implicates problems for the statute's constitutional
ity under the Tenth Amendment.
c.

The Privacy Protection Act under current Tenth
Amendment analysis

The Privacy Protection Act may be unconstitutional even as
interpreted by the majority in Citicasters. The Supreme Court is
increasingly protective of the right of states to control their core
functions, and law enforcement is at the heart of such core func
tions. 262 In 1992, the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution
restricts Congress from compelling the states to enact or enforce a
federal regulatory program. 263 Most recently, in Printz v. United
considering the same statute have upheld its constitutionality under the third prong of
the Lopez analysis, which allows Congress to regulate activities which have a "substan
tial relation" to interstate commerce. These courts have noted that Congress had spe
cifically found that carjacking has an effect on interstate commerce. See Bishop, 66
F.3d at 580, 584; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 237; United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1995). But see
Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590-92 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that carjacking does not have a sufficient relationship to interstate commercial activity
to allow Congress to regulate it through the Commerce Clause).
261. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa.
262. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (stating that criminal law enforcement is an area
"where States historically have been sovereign"); see also Julian Epstein, Evolving
Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525,
525-26 (1997); Chris Marks, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and United States v.
Lopez: The Supreme Court Resuscitates the Tenth Amendment, 68 U. COL. L. REV. 541,
569 (1997) (noting that the recent Supreme Court decisions are "a wakeup call for Con
gress to take a long, hard look before it starts to regulate" (quoting Carter G. Phillips &
Joseph Calve, What Does Lopez Mean?, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 14».
263. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that it is
unconstitutional for Congress to compel the states to either accept ownership of low
level radioactive waste or to compel states to regulate in order to enforce a federal law).
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States ,264 the Court struck down as unconstitutional a provision of
the Brady Act which required local law enforcement officers to per
form a background check on prospective purchasers of guns. 265
The Court held that "[t]he Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivi
sions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. "266
Arguably, the Privacy Protection Act does not compel states to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, nor does it compel
state agents (law enforcement officers) to enforce a regulatory pro
gram. Instead, the Privacy Protection Act compels state agents to
substitute certain procedures, because procedures which they might
otherwise use, while constitutional, inhibit the effective operation
of the press, which is involved in interstate commerce. 267 In Printz,
the Brady Act impermissibly compelled state agents to perform a
new duty, not to substitute an existing duty, in order to achieve the
goal of enforcing the federal handgun controllaw. 268
On the other hand, the Act does impose a new duty, which is
the duty to avoid the use of search warrants when seeking informa
tion from persons involved in First Amendment activities. Before
the enactment of the Privacy Protection Act, law enforcement of
ficers were not asked to differentiate among third party non-sus
pects. Their duty was to focus solely on the search for evidence.
In addition, the Privacy Protection Act regulates police proce
dures as the means by which the goal of protecting the press is
achieved. While it does not appear to fall neatly within the forbid
den categories of enlisting states to effectuate federal "programs,"
arguably, Congress' goal in passing the Act-giving greater protec
tion to the press-is a federal program. Further, its direct control
of the behavior of state offic.ers may be equally offensive to the
principles of the Tenth Amendment,269 especially since state law
permits, and the First and Fourth Amendments do not restrict, their
264. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
265. See id. at 2384.
266. Id.
267. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
268. See.Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
269. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 984-85 (D.S.C. 1997) (finding that the
Driver'S Privacy Protection Act, which was based on the Commerce Clause and re
stricted the information which could be released from state motor vehicle records, was
unconstitutional in light of Printz, because it regulated the conduct of state motor vehi
cle department employees).
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actions.270 If the Privacy Protection Act were to require that an
assertion of the grounds for an exception to the Act be stated by
the law enforcement officer applying for a warrant, as argued by the
dissent in Citicasters, it would only impose more suspect directives
on state agent behavior.
Courts, which strive to avoid finding that statutes are unconsti
tutional, must interpret enacted legislation in a way that will mini
mize Tenth Amendment implications. 271 Thus, in light of
heightened Tenth Amendment concerns, the Privacy Protection Act
must be interpreted as the majority did in Citicasters.
d.

The role of the clear statement rule for courts

The Privacy Protection Act does not explicitly require law en
forcement officers to state their reasons for seeking a warrant to the
issuing magistrate, and prudent statutory interpretation, in light of
recent cases like New York v. United States 272 and Printz v. United
States,273 indicates that law enforcement officers have no such obli
gation. Unless Congress makes a clear statement of its intent to
interfere with an aspect of state-controlled law enforcement proce
dures, courts should not assume such an intent was present. 274
While merely an interpretive tool, and perhaps not fairly imposed
post hoc, a "clear statement" rule provides the court with a guide
line for interpreting laws which pose potential Tenth Amendment
problems. A strong "clear statement" rule was articulated in Greg
270. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (noting that when the object of a law is to
"direct the functioning of the state executive," it offends the principles of separate
sovereignty).
271. See John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth Amend
ment Since United States v. Darby, 27 CUMBo L. REv. 445, 521-22 (1996-97).
272. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See supra note 256 for a brief discussion of New York V.
United States.
273. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). See supra note 256 for a brief discussion of Printz.
274. For example, in the area of the federal government impinging on a state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, see the following cases: Seminole Tribe V.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (stating that Congress may not invalidate states' sover
eign immunity unless it has "unequivocally expresse[d]" its intent to do so (quoting
Green V. Nansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985»); Will V. Michigan Department of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (finding that a clear statement is required to compel states to
entertain damages suits against themselves in state courts); Atascadero State Hospital V.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (holding that the intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity must be expressed in "unmistakable language"). See also Gade V. National
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111-12 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that there is a "longstanding rule" that the Court "will not infer pre-emption of
the States' historical police powers absent a clear statement of intent by Congress").
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ory v. Ashcroft ,275 where the Court held that in order to enforce
Commerce Clause-based statutes regulating the states, it would ex
pect to be "absolutely certain" that Congress explicitly contem
plated and decided to impose a federal provision over a
fundamentally state function. 276 Congress should clearly state into
which areas of traditional state control it plans to intrude. 277
It is Congress, and not the courts, which decides to intrude into
areas of traditional state control. Since Congress did not clearly
state its intent to regulate law enforcement procedures by way of
requiring law enforcement officers to articulate to a magistrate the
reason for seeking to use the warrant exception to the Privacy Pro
tection Act, courts should refrain from imposing such regulations.
CONCLUSION

Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act to protect the First
Amendment rights of the press by limiting the ability of police to
use the invasive tool of search warrants on press premises. The Act
is silent on the issue of whether a law enforcement officer must
state in his affidavit for a search warrant under which exception
provided by the Privacy Protection Act a warrant, instead of a sub
275. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). In Gregory, the Court held that a state did not have to
comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and modify its
mandatory retirement provisions applying to state judges. See id. at 473. The ADEA
bars employers, including state governments, from adopting mandatory retirement poli
cies, but it exempts state government "appointee[s] on the policymaking level." Id. at
465. The Court stated that unless Congress clearly stated that it intended to displace
state government retirement policies, such fundamental state sovereign decisions would
be left alone by the Court. See id. at 467.
276. See id. at 464. William N. Eskridge, Jf. and Philip P. Frickey, in their fore
word to The Supreme Court, 1993 Term in the Harvard Law Review note, "[t]he deci
sion in Gregory was the Court's signal to Congress that the Tenth Amendment has bite
again ... at least where Congress regulates the states as states." William N. Eskridge,
Jf. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 82
(1994); see also Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation
of States, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1959, 1972 (1994).
277. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding that defendants
could not be convicted under federal statute without proof that the gun possessed was
"in or affecting interstate commerce"). In Bass the Court stated the following:
[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance. Congress has traditionally
been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as crim
inal by the States .... In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation af
fecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the
legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical mat
ters involved in the judicial decision.
Id. at 345.
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poena, is being sought. There is no conclusive evidence either that
Congress intentionally omitted procedural language, or that it as
sumed this procedure would be used to comply with the Act.
It is the job of the courts to interpret laws and to protect Con
stitutional rights. The Privacy Protection Act has multiple links to
the Constitution. Congress used the Commerce Clause for author
ity to pass the Act, and it was attempting to protect First Amend
ment rights and add protection not provided under the Fourth
Amendment. The Act also implicates the Tenth Amendment,
which protects the states' rights to govern fundamental functions
that protect the health, safety, and welfare of its residents. In such
a case, courts must closely adhere to the intent of Congress as ex
pressed in the language of the Act, but they must interpret legisla
tion in a way that closely guards the rights afforded citizens and
states by the Constitution.
If a reviewing court decides that Congress intended to require
law enforcement officers to articulate to a magistrate the reasons
they think an exception to the Act has been met, the decision will
result in the imposition of duties on both state and local law en
forcement officers and magistrates. Such a decision would impli
cate Tenth Amendment rights. Given that recent Supreme Court
decisions reflect an increasing scrutiny of federal legislation that im
poses duties on state agencies, the constitutionality of the Privacy
Protection Act even without the contested procedure is suspect. A
court should not infer that additional procedures were intended.
Thus, judicial conclusions regarding congressional intent to
regulate state and local police procedures, protected generally by
the Tenth Amendment, should be based on explicit language.
Courts should apply a "clear statement" rule when analyzing stat
utes that intrude into areas of traditional state control.
Congress has not made a clear statement of its intent to require
judges or magistrates to rule on stated exceptions to the Privacy
Protection Act, and therefore such a procedure should not be re
quired by courts. While this interpretation may mean that the Act
fails to achieve Congress' purpose in passing the statute, it is Con
gress, and not the courts, that must attempt to rectify the problem.
Elizabeth H. Sillin

